In brief:
- On 20 October 2020, the US Department of Justice and 11 US states brought a claim against Google, alleging that the tech giant violated US competition law on the online search market (United States et al. v Google). On 17 December 2020, a similar claim was brought by 38 US states (State of Colorado et al. v Google). The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
- On 2 September 2025, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ("US Court") handed down its remedies judgment in United States et al. v Google and State of Colorado et al. v Google ("Remedy Judgment"). This follows the US Court's earlier liability judgment of 5 August 2024 ("Liability Judgment"), in which Google was found to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct affecting the market for internet search by entering into exclusive distribution agreements.
- While Google was not required to divest Chrome, the US Court did order several behavioural remedies intended to open the market, including compelling Google to share certain data with competitors. The divestment of Chrome was sought by the plaintiffs in an effort to address Google's search monopoly and, if granted, would have fundamentally reshaped the internet browser market.
- In the UK and EU, Google's conduct in search has similarly been subject to frequent investigation by regulators and challenged in private competition law claims, including in a recent consumer class action brought in the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CAT").
- However, new enforcement tools in these jurisdictions, which are without parallel in the US, emphasise the intense regulatory and political focus on addressing the concentration of power in digital markets and may also provide additional avenues for private actions against "Big Tech" companies.
- As a result, Google might find itself facing broader remedial steps in the UK and EU.
Google found liable in US for anti-competitive conduct in search market
In the Liability Judgment, the US Court found that Google had breached section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), which requires firms with monopoly power not to wilfully maintain their monopoly through anti-competitive conduct. Google had entered into exclusive distribution agreements with device makers, browser developers and mobile carriers. The agreements made Google the default, pre-installed internet search provider or ensured it was prominently placed on devices in the majority of search access points, which significantly increased the volume of search queries made through Google's search engine. The US Court found that the resulting scale and data advantages were so significant that competitors were unable to meaningfully compete, "thereby inoculating Google against any genuine competitive threat" in the internet search market.
Notably, the US Court considered that Google's distribution agreements were de facto "exclusive", notwithstanding that some of the agreements did not require complete contractual exclusivity. For instance, the agreements between certain third parties and Google required the third party to load Google as the default search engine on the web browser on its devices, but did not stop a consumer from subsequently changing the default search engine. In reality, however, very few end users ever changed the default search engine. Accordingly, the US Court held these to be exclusivity agreements that contributed to maintaining Google's monopoly power in the online search market.
Remedies ordered by the US Court
The plaintiffs sought wide-ranging behavioural and structural remedies (including the divestiture of Chrome). Ultimately, most of the remedies sought were rejected, with the US Court ordering refined behavioural remedies only, namely:
- Exclusivity agreements prohibited: Google is no longer permitted to enter into or maintain exclusivity contracts to distribute Google Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, the Gemini App or other generative AI products for six years. This is intended to reduce the strength of Google's existing monopoly in search, and to prevent Google from using its existing monopoly to gain an advantage in the generative AI market.
- Data to be shared with competitors: Google was ordered to share certain data with competitors to help Google's competitors overcome the scale and data disadvantages created by Google's anti-competitive exclusivity agreements. First, Google is required to share certain data from its search index (such as websites' URL and their "spam scores") and user interaction data with "qualified competitors", at marginal cost on a "one-off" basis. Second, Google must share with competitors the results and content of its search engine results page in response to certain queries. Although narrower than the remedies sought by the plaintiffs, these data-sharing remedies are intended to enable Google's competitors to improve their own search capabilities and therefore better compete with Google while they build their own search index and search stack. Such data sharing requirements have historically been rarely ordered as remedies for anti-competitive conduct.
The US Court declined to order other remedies sought by the plaintiffs, including the divestiture of Google Chrome, the implementation of choice screens, and a general ban on payment to distribution partners for favourable placement on devices and browsers:
- Chrome divestiture not required: Despite the finding on liability, the US Court declined to order the divestiture of Chrome or the Android operating system. It reasoned that Google did not use these assets to carry out or effect the anti-competitive exclusivity arrangements, so divestiture would be inappropriate. The US Court also explained that divestiture would be logistically complicated and likely result in a worse service for consumers.
- Choice screens not required: The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought the implementation of "choice screens" on mobile browsers and devices to prompt users to consider changing the default search engine on their devices. The US Court reasoned that it was not its place to order the redesign of a product and noted that the implementation of choice screens by Google in the EU since 2020 on its Android phones had had little effect on breaking Google's monopoly.
- No ban on payment to distribution partners for preloading/favourable placement: The US Court reasoned that such a remedy would not effectively address Google's dominance in the search market and would deprive distributors of an important source of income, causing them substantial harm.
In its consideration of remedies, the US Court highlighted that in the year since the Liability Judgment, the "emergence of GenAI changed the course of this case". It recognised that the development of generative AI assistants presented a new competitive pressure in the search ecosystem, with millions of users now using such chatbots to gather information they previously sought through internet search. However, it was not the case that generative AI products had eliminated the need for general search engines; rather, generative AI chatbots were still reliant upon high quality internet search functionality, for example, to "ground" results. Accordingly, the US Court noted that the remedy proceedings had "been as much about promoting competition among [general search engines] as ensuring that Google's dominance in search does not carry over into the GenAI space".
Google has indicated that it is closely reviewing the Liability Judgment, and it is possible that we may see an appeal of the Liability Judgment by Google and/or an appeal of the Remedy Judgment by the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the first instance judgments represent significant intervention in the search market, and may prompt wider changes both in terms of firm behaviour in, and regulation of, digital markets in the US.
The search for fair play: Google faces wider challenges to its search dominance in the UK and the EU under new digital markets regimes
In recent years, Google has faced increasing enforcement action by regulators (as well as private damages actions) in the UK and the EU under existing competition rules, which impose similar obligations to the US Sherman Antitrust Act.
By way of example, in the UK the CAT has recently certified a collective claim brought by Nikki Stopford on behalf of UK consumers (Stopford v. Alphabet Inc and others) which alleges that Google's distribution agreements in the online search market and certain adjacent markets constitute an abuse of dominance. The parties are currently working through disclosure and other case management issues as they await a timetable to trial. In 2018, the European Commission fined Google €4 billion in respect of its finding that Google's distribution agreements for Google Search relating to Android smartphones were anti-competitive (AT.40099 Google Android), with this decision currently the subject of a final appeal by Google before the European Court of Justice. Further, earlier this year, Google was fined €2.95 billion by the European Commission in respect of certain conduct in the advertising technology market, with related regulatory actions and private damages claims being pursued in the US and UK.
However, the regulatory environment within which Google (and other large incumbent firms operating in digital markets) must operate in the UK and the EU has been made more complicated, and more prescriptive, with the introduction of the digital markets regimes – which are without parallel in the US. As a result, the scope for regulatory intervention and/or sanction in these jurisdictions has materially increased.
Turning first to consider the position in the UK, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 ("DMCC Act") gives the Competition and Markets Authority ("CMA") broad powers to investigate and designate undertakings as having "strategic market status" ("SMS") in respect of a digital activity where it has substantial and entrenched market power and a position of "strategic significance". Firms designated with SMS are subject to individual, tailored conduct requirements intended to ensure fair competition in the relevant sector.
After a period of public consultation, on 10 October 2025 the CMA formally designated Google as having SMS in respect of its online search services. The CMA's Final Decision reports that Google's market power in general search and search advertising is substantial and enduring, supported by high barriers to entry. Whilst the AI space has experienced rapid growth, the CMA considers that AI assistants have not yet challenged Google's dominance, and Google is also actively integrating AI into its own services. The designation covers Google Search (including AI features), certain syndication products, and search advertising products (Google Ads and SA360 when they provide search advertising). Specialised search services, Google News and the Gemini AI assistant are currently excluded.
This designation means that the CMA has the power to impose specific conduct requirements on Google targeted at improving the general functioning of the search market. In its roadmap regarding Google's SMS designation ("Roadmap"), the CMA outlined its proposed priorities for intervention should Google be designated, which focus on data portability and fair ranking principles. The Roadmap sets out that intervention in relation to Google's third-party exclusivity agreements and access to underlying search data will be considered in light of the US Remedy Judgment and upcoming developments internationally. The CMA is expected to release an updated roadmap in early 2026 which we anticipate will clarify whether it intends to go further than the US Court, or if it is satisfied with the remedies imposed there.
More broadly, decisions taken by the CMA under the DMCC Act also create opportunities for private litigants affected by designated firms' conduct to seek remedies in the event of non-compliance. A significant proportion of collective actions heard by the CAT have involved "Big Tech" companies and often concern complaints of insufficient interoperability or unfair use of data (see, for example, Neill v Sony and Gormsen v Meta), which are key areas of interest under the DMCC Act. In the future, such claims could be strengthened by new causes of action alleging that such conduct is non-compliant with the statutory conduct requirements imposed under the DMCC Act.
Similarly, in the EU, Google's search monopoly has faced scrutiny in relation to its distribution agreements for Google Search and compliance with its obligations under the EU's own digital markets legislation, the Digital Markets Act 2022 ("DMA"), in respect of which Google was designated as a "gatekeeper" in 2023 for certain services including Google Search and Google Chrome. Like the SMS designations in the UK, firms designated as "gatekeepers" under the DMA are required to comply with specific obligations, such as ensuring fair access for third parties and the obligation not to favour their own services over those of third parties. In the two years since Google's designation came into effect, the Commission has investigated and issued preliminary findings in respect of several instances of non-compliance under the DMA, including in respect of Google Search and the Google Play store. A formal finding that the gatekeeper has failed to comply with these obligations can lead to fines imposed by the Commission – which Apple and Meta have already been subject to – and potentially private damages actions, in the same way as such claims have often been brought in the wake of regulatory scrutiny or formal findings of breaches of traditional competition laws.
In summary, therefore, whilst it may be considered that the US Court's approach to remedying Google's conduct in the search market was relatively favourable to the tech giant, there is a real possibility that Google may be subject to broader remedial action in the UK and EU under the new digital markets regimes, through both regulatory intervention and subsequent private damages claims.