On 18 November 2025, the British domestic intelligence agency MI5 informed Members of Parliament and peers that operatives for the Chinese Ministry of State Security were actively attempting to cultivate access to the UK’s decision‑making ecosystem by engaging individuals through headhunters and professional networks such as LinkedIn.1
MI5 pinpointed two LinkedIn profiles, “Amanda Qiu” and “Shirly Shen”, allegedly acting on behalf of Chinese intelligence to recruit UK‑based intermediaries and access commercially sensitive material.2
The methodology behind the approach is to target executives or high level professionals with plausible roles in think‑tanks, consultancies or government research and cultivate relationships under the guise of freelance work as well as offering financial or travel‑based incentives. This will then eventually transition to tasks that involve providing insider insight or information.3
This warning comes amid broader concerns over foreign interference, particularly from China, which is now being categorised by MI5 as a daily national‑security threat.4 The UK Government has signalled its intention to invest GBP £170 million in upgrading encrypted communications and digital protective frameworks in response.5
For businesses operating within the UK or for high level actors or executives, this highlights several risks:
- Personnel exposure: Individuals with access to Government departments, critical infrastructure or policy‑influencing roles may be targeted.
- Corporate intelligence risk: What begins as seemingly benign recruitment or consultancy outreach could evolve into the extraction of commercially or strategically sensitive data.
- Regulatory and reputational fallout: Companies with UK presence may be impacted by stricter scrutiny over foreign‑linked engagements and their hiring practices.
This follows a pattern that we have tracked throughout the past year: an uptick in covert foreign interference operations targeting UK soil, often through seemingly innocuous channels. In July, we reported on the unmasking of a Russian‑backed spy cell composed of Bulgarian nationals embedded in Harrow and in September, we covered the dismantling of a Belarusian intelligence network operating across Europe.
Each case has highlighted a similar arc: professional or personal networks used as entry points, commercial or reputational incentives offered as bait, and legal or regulatory ambiguity exploited to delay or frustrate enforcement.