After years of mounting tensions and diplomatic deadlock, the United States (US) and Iran reopened indirect nuclear negotiations in Muscat and Rome this month. The talks, which began on 12 April 2025, were the first substantive diplomatic engagement between the two governments since US President Donald Trump began his second term in office.
The two rounds of negotiations were ultimately described as 'constructive', but if past behaviour is any indicator of future performance, we can expect a tumultuous path forward for both parties as they both seek to advance what appear to be diametrically opposed agendas.
Their reengagement follows a letter from President Trump to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in March, proposing a new round of nuclear discussions. Iran initially denied the bid for direct negotiations but agreed to indirect negotiations following a statement that was widely circulated in media spaces from President Trump noting:
"If they don't make a deal, there will be bombing… It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before… There's a chance that if they don't make a deal, that I will do secondary tariffs on them like I did four years ago."
Since his return to office, President Trump has reinstituted the "maximum pressure" campaign that defined his first term's Iran policy, an aggressive sanctions regime targeting Iranian oil exports, banking, and other economic lifelines. Iran, meanwhile, has been gradually escalating its nuclear enrichment efforts and support for regional proxies from Hamas to Hezbollah to the Houthis.
On 19 Apri 2025, the US and Iran held a second round of indirect negotiations in Rome, again mediated by Omani officials. These talks were described by a US official as making "very good progress". Both parties agreed to reconvene for further talks in Oman on 26 April, to discuss technical aspects of a potential agreement.
Iranian sanctions relief for nuclear restraint
Iran appears to be entering these negotiations at a stark disadvantage. The country's economy has been severely handicapped by years of isolation; inflation is hovering above 30%, the currency continues to depreciate, and unemployment remains high. This, coupled with waves of social unrest, mean that the country's current president, Masoud Pezeshkian, elected on promises of economic stabilisation and reduced tensions with the West, will be seeking to negotiate significant sanctions relief.
In return, Tehran will almost certainly be willing to accept limits on uranium enrichment levels and increased oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it refuses to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure altogether, insisting that its nuclear program is solely for civilian purposes and is demanding recognition of its right to peaceful nuclear energy; sentiments not shared by the IAEA, which deems its current enrichment levels to far exceed what is required for civilian use.
The Islamic Republic has also made clear that any meaningful concessions on its part will require verifiable and sustained sanctions relief in key sectors, like oil exports, international banking access, and industrial imports. They are also reportedly seeking guarantees that any deal would survive a change of administration in Washington, a point made difficult by the partisan divisions over Iran policy in the US.
US demands
The US enters the negotiations with the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability. While full dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program remains a long-standing objective, the Trump administration appears to be recalibrating toward more achievable short-term goals, such as capping enrichment levels, reducing stockpiles of enriched uranium, and allowing thorough IAEA inspections with "ironclad verification mechanisms".
Additionally, US negotiators are pressing for broader commitments from Iran to scale back its support for proxy forces in the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq and Syria. Iran's ballistic missile program remains another sticking point, with American officials considering Iran's missile development a threat to its regional allies, namely Israel and the Gulf states, as well as a potential delivery system for future nuclear capabilities.
Looking forward
Both the US and Iran have agreed to further discussions, likely taking place after the publication of this article, which are anticipated to delve deeper into the practical applications of a deal, whilst still being limited in scope to sanctions lifting and nuclear disarmament.
There are several plausible outcomes of these talks, provided they continue. The first is a narrowly tailored interim deal that offers Iran partial sanctions relief in exchange for pausing its most advanced nuclear activities. This could function as a stopgap measure, similar to the phased ceasefire negotiated by the US in Gaza, to allow for longer negotiations to run on in the background.
The second is a more comprehensive agreement that includes nuclear limits, missile curbs, and regional de-escalation, though this would require major concessions from both sides, an outcome we assess is unlikely given the current rhetoric on both sides of the negotiating table and the perceived power imbalance between the US and Iran.
A third possibility is the collapse of talks altogether, leading to heightened tensions and the likely leading to a military confrontation. Israeli officials have already signalled that they are prepared to act unilaterally if they believe Iran is nearing a nuclear weapons threshold, and reports suggest contingency planning is underway for potential strikes.