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Parr v Cheshire East: a rare win for personal welfare deputyships

Posted on 12 November 2026

Reading time 7 minutes

In brief

  • Ruby Parr's case is a rare successful application for a personal welfare deputyship ("PWD"). The Mental Capacity Act 2005 is predicated on the protection of individual autonomy and allows welfare decisions to be made collaboratively by those involved in the care of an incapacitated adult, without the need for a deputyship.
  • Mr Justice Poole appointed Ruby's mother as her deputy after evidence of recurring care failures, concluding that this would not diminish Ruby's autonomy, since she could not exercise it in any event, and that a deputy would ensure that her best interests are promoted in situations where she would otherwise have no voice.
  • By contrast, a similar application for HB, another young adult, was first refused, but the Court of Appeal reversed this, holding a deputy can enhance rather than diminish one's ability to influence their life.
  • Different approaches lead to a live question about systemic under-resourcing: when public bodies are overstretched, at what point should pragmatism about effective decision-making outweigh the individual's right to autonomy?

Introduction

The recent decision in the case of Ruby Parr deserves to be read by anyone navigating the care of an incapacitated adult. It is a rare example of a successful application for a personal welfare deputyship ("PWD"), setting out the factors which led the judge to appoint Alison Parr as the deputy of her incapacitated daughter, Ruby.

With an ageing population, more importance is being placed on ensuring that one's wealth and welfare are managed appropriately once capacity is lost. Lasting Powers of Attorney ("LPAs") are an effective and popular way to manage that eventuality. Deputyships, however, remain much rarer, especially PWDs – why?

The legal framework

The answer is that PWDs are rare because Parliament intended them to be. Perhaps unsurprisingly: Western societies have, for centuries, been shaped by political, philosophical and economic theories centred on individual liberties. Those theories do not sit comfortably with the forced delegation of one's decision-making

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the "Act"), which gives the Court of Protection jurisdiction to decide for an incapacitated adult, is permeated by the principle that autonomy should be protected – for example, through the statutory presumption of capacity and the rule that a deputyship be as limited as reasonably practicable.

This applies equally to property and affairs deputyships and PWDs, but with very different effect: some 12 property and affairs applications are made for every PWD application. Section 5 explains why: it protects from liability anyone who reasonably believes an individual lacks capacity and acts in their best interests, so health and welfare decisions can often be made collaboratively without a PWD.

Until recently, Lawson was the leading authority: an adult's autonomy must be vigilantly guarded, making a PWD an unnecessarily restrictive outcome in the vast majority of cases. Parr shows what it took to persuade the Court otherwise. What was different?

The Parr case

Ruby is a young woman with life-limiting physical and mental conditions, including severe epilepsy (over 30 seizures a day) and global developmental delay. She is unable to walk or talk and is at constant risk of sudden death. Her mother, Alison, a former NHS nurse, gave up work to become her full-time carer.

When Ruby was still 17, Alison applied to be appointed her personal welfare deputy. The application was refused on the papers; Alison's request for reconsideration was eventually allocated to Mr Justice Poole.

By the time of the hearing, Ruby had turned 18. Those intervening months gave Alison an opportunity to experience recurring and serious practical difficulties, having lost parental responsibility and, with it, her voice in Ruby's care:

  • paramedics nearly commenced an inappropriate CPR procedure during a seizure, not understanding that Ruby's epilepsy could cause a form of stasis, and were unpersuaded by Alison's explanation; and
  • the high staff turnover in the various bodies involved in Ruby's care (including eight different social workers in three years) meant there was no continuity in her care, and professionals often relied on Alison to pass on key information.

Some of these will sound familiar to those involved in the care of a loved one. An imminent decision on whether Ruby should move into a specialist residential care facility was also expected to generate further welfare decisions.

Against that backdrop, Mr Justice Poole took a pragmatic approach and found it in Ruby's best interests for Alison to be appointed her deputy. His reasoning includes several notable points:

  • Ruby "needs decisions to be made about her personal welfare and health frequently and rapidly", and "a constant voice in decision-making will be to her advantage", particularly relevant given her anticipated move to residential care, where the facility operators wanted "to know that they can turn to [Alison] for any best interest decisions about Ruby's personal welfare."
  • Mr Justice Poole also observed that "it may be naive to think that families such as Ruby's always deal with well-informed, well-resourced, fully trained professionals who know the disabled and incapacitous person well and are capable of understanding their complex needs".
  • The factor that perhaps tilted the balance most, however, was that a PWD would not remove any real autonomy from Ruby, since she cannot exercise it, nor is she expected to in future.

Why it matters

Parr indicates what evidence could persuade the court on PWD applications: the inadequacy of informal decision-making, coupled with Ruby's total and permanent lack of capacity, meant protecting her autonomy did not bite as it usually does.

Difficulties with complex needs and discontinuity in state-funded care are not uncommon, and the pragmatism in Mr Justice Poole's decision is, in the author's view, to be welcomed. That tension with the MCA's restrictive framework was soon tested in the case of another incapacitated young adult, HB, whose parents applied for a PWD after numerous care failings.

HB's case later reached the Court of Appeal, but the first instance decision shows how unusual Parr is. HB's parents gave evidence of recurrent situations where their views on HB's best interests diverged from those of the authorities involved in his care, which were only solved by HB's parents' willingness to take an assertive approach (and on occasion, resort to litigation). However, the judge took the view that those frictions showed the collaborative process envisaged by Parliament could work, and dismissed the application.

It is difficult to reconcile Parr with HHJ Beckley's view that a deputyship's benefits did not outweigh HB's right to autonomy – though HHJ Beckley himself granted permission to appeal, acknowledging the similarities with Parr.

The Court of Appeal overturned HHJ Beckley's decision, endorsing the pragmatism of Parr on the interplay between decision-making and autonomy:

"The purpose of a [personal welfare deputyship] is to facilitate decision-making. In many cases of this kind, including the present, the appointment of a deputy may in practice enhance rather than diminish the effectiveness of decision-making for P and may increase, rather than reduce, P’s ability to influence the course of their life."

Paragraph 63 gives examples where PWDs may enhance autonomy, including where "public bodies have failed, or threaten to fail, properly to apply the MCA 2005 framework, particularly in relation to consultation with families".

Leaving legal debate aside, the divergent approaches touch a live political question: many economies are questioning the sustainability of welfare models, forcing governments to choose between cutting public services or running deficits. Ruby's and HB's experiences show under-resourcing can undermine the collaborative process Parliament envisaged. Yet defaulting to deputyships to compensate for resourcing failures sits uneasily with the right to autonomy. Parliament might usefully clarify: at what point should pragmatism outweigh that right?

How Mishcon de Reya can help 

Mishcon de Reya advises individuals and families on complex mental capacity and Court of Protection matters, including applications for personal welfare deputyships. We can help families navigate difficult health and welfare decisions, understand the options available under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and make applications to the Court of Protection where formal authority is needed

 

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