On 13 March 2026, the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") issued a Final Notice, imposing a prohibition on Kasim Garipoglu, as a result of misconduct (in respect of the underlying conduct, and his subsequent engagement with the FCA) between April 2012 and December 2022. The Final Notice followed a reference by Mr Garipoglu to the Upper Tribunal and an appeal to the Court of Appeal, both of which were struck out. However, the FCA was not able to fine Mr Garipoglu due to the period that has elapsed since he was an approved person.
Background
Mr Garipoglu was the ultimate beneficial owner of two FCA-regulated entities:
- Company A was an authorised firm providing online financial trading of FX and CFDs. Mr Garipoglu was the Chief Executive and a Director of Company A, both of which are controlled functions; and;
- Company B was an authorised e-money institution between March 2016 and July 2018 when its authorisation was revoked.
The FCA made a series of findings of particularly egregious conduct, ultimately concluding that Mr Garipoglu lacked honesty and integrity.
Disregard for AML, compliance and general regulatory obligations
The Final Notice contains several examples of Mr Garipoglu's bad conduct, which are too numerous to list in full. One such example relates to the 'Competitor Model', which Mr Garipoglu copied from another company. In short, the proposal was for Company A to onboard customers and permit them to commence trading without verifying who they were, with a view to increasing new customers. KYC or AML checks would then be carried out if the client made a withdrawal.
When emailing senior members of the Compliance Management Team, Mr Garipoglu said members of the Compliance Management Team, Mr Garipoglu said "[m]y aim is not to break any law but be sure that it will be pushed to the limit […]". Mr Garipoglu was told by senior members of the Compliance and Management Team at Company A that senior individuals were "vehemently against us changing the procedure for accepting client on-boarding and offering any shortcuts to deposit money. So this will not be approved." However, Mr Garipoglu continued to insist on the Competitor Model to increase the number of new customers that Company A was able to onboard. Indeed, when one senior member told Mr Garipoglu that "[y]ou have got to understand that AML is the single most serious thing in the world right now!", Mr Garipogly simply removed him from an email chain and told others that "Aml is the most idotic [sic] thing I have ever heard in my business life , If I need to lounder [sic] money why the hell I would come to a broker where there are millions of other ways to do”.
At a later date, a senior member of the Compliance and Management Team sent Mr Garipoglu a legal opinion concerning the Competitor Model. However, Mr Garipoglu replied to say "[n]ot reading it, hope we didn’t waste money on it, if [the competitor] is doing it we are doing it as well, If our situation was not as today, uk would have more credit to back me off, but all those credits have been used". Mr Garipoglu then directed that the Competitor Model be adopted across Company A, noting that "any one who thinks its not right or correct or against the law can file a complain… so its time for the old London mind set to change to effective isreali [sic] internet minded work flow . how good our compaliance [sic] will do their job will be determined by when/if .hit [shit] hits the fan , if we get away with no fine , or something acceptable than [sic] it means as a team we have done a good job , but no if our systems , compliance documantations [sic] , procedures etc will kill us that means it has done a bad job […]."
After the introduction of the Competitor Model, Mr Garipoglu was explicitly told that the Competitor Model was not legal and a breach of Company A's regulatory and legal obligations, and could lead to criminal liability and fines from the FCA. However, Mr Garipoglu refused to change until 18 months after the Competitor Model had been introduced..
In summarising Mr Garipoglu's conduct in respect of AML, compliance and general regulatory obligations:
- The FCA said that overall, the documentary evidence revealed that Mr Garipoglu communicated with staff in a highly inappropriate manner, demonstrating a disregard for AML and compliance obligations, a disregard for the advice of AML and compliance personnel, and a willingness to instruct a course of action without an honest and reasonable belief, or being reckless as to whether, it was compliant with regulatory requirements.
- The evidence further demonstrated a willingness to run a serious risk of breach of regulatory requirements, or actually breach them, to achieve commercial advantage, as well as positive encouragement for excessive risk-taking and applause for staff who prioritised profitability over regulatory compliance.
- On a significant number of occasions, Mr Garipoglu misled, overruled and undermined compliance personnel, including senior AML and compliance professionals, contributing to an environment within Company A in which there was an open disregard for AML and compliance obligations. The FCA found that he did so because of his focus on the generation of clients and revenue.
Deliberately misleading the FCA and other regulatory bodies
In addition, Mr Garipoglu deliberately sought to mislead the FCA and several other regulatory bodies across the world by providing false and/or misleading documentation or information in relation to, amongst other things:
- Compulsory AML training which he falsely claimed to have undertaken, despite a clear documentary audit trail showing that he asked someone else to take it on his behalf.
- The creation and use of a forged utility bill to evidence the London residence of a Turkish employee at Company A, with whom Mr Garipoglu falsely claimed to have lived.
- Falsifying information in respect of his university education when in reality, he did not graduate from university.
- Providing information that he knew to be false in an application for authorisation by Company B which was submitted to the FCA.
- When interviewed by the FCA and in submissions made on his behalf between November 2018 and December 2022, Mr Garipoglu maintained there was nothing improper about his communications with staff, which he characterised as "good governance".
Prohibition
The FCA commenced its investigation into Mr Garipoglu (as well as two of his associates and Company A) in July 2016, as a result of concerns about Company A's ability to comply with AML requirements. The investigation was both criminal and regulatory, though the criminal investigation was discontinued on 6 August 2020.
The FCA concluded that Mr Garipoglu is not a fit and proper person on the basis that he lacks honesty and integrity, and that he poses a risk to consumers and to the integrity of the UK financial system.
Mr Garipoglu had offered to provide legal undertakings, a breach of which would be potentially be punishable by imprisonment, backed by £2 million to be held in escrow. The undertakings include refraining from any involvement in financial services worldwide and to ensure that none of his businesses onboard UK customers. However, the FCA rejected these voluntary measures as an alternative to a prohibition order, noting in particular that the statutory safeguards of a prohibition order, which include the requirement for authorised firms to take reasonable care to ensure prohibited individuals do not perform regulated functions, and the public record of prohibition orders maintained by the FCA available for public inspection, cannot be replaced by voluntary undertakings.
Comment
First, as to the prohibition itself, the decision demonstrates that voluntarily withdrawing from the UK financial services industry will not, of itself, shield an individual from prohibition. The FCA made clear that expressions of present or future intention not to work in the UK financial services industry are insufficient. It would also signal to bad actors that they can avoid public enforcement outcomes if they conduct themselves improperly in the UK and then exit it. However, it should be noted that the FCA's responses to Mr Garipoglu's representations emphasise the many occasions on which he misled the FCA. It is unclear if the FCA would adopt a similar approach in less extreme circumstances.
Second, it is unclear why an investigation that was opened in July 2016 did not lead to a Decision Notice until almost 9 years later. Indeed, the FCA's press release notes that although Mr Garipoglu has been prohibited, "the FCA has not been able to fine [Mr Garipoglu] due to the length of time since he was an approved person." That is an alarming outcome in circumstances where the Final Notice repeatedly refers to the clear documentary record of Mr Garipoglu's misconduct, and the FCA's observation in its press release that Mr Garipoglu "poses an ongoing risk to consumers and to the integrity of the UK financial system". One must question whether the FCA was meeting its strategic aim of fighting financial crime in light of this timeline. Since the investigation commenced, new Directors of Enforcement and Market Oversight (Therese Chambers and Steve Smart) have been appointed. The new directors have very publicly set out that a key aim was to increase the speed of investigations and recent cases do generally demonstrate that they have achieved that aim. This legacy case serves as a stark reminder that delays in investigations can have a detrimental effect on enforcement outcomes i here, directly resulting in the FCA's inability to impose a financial penalty.
Finally, the notice raises the familiar issue considered in FCA v Macris [2017] UKSC 19, namely whether a third party has been “identified” in a regulatory notice for the purposes of section 393 of FSMA. Although the relevant firms in the notice are anonymised, they are very easy to identify through a search against Mr Garipoglu's name in the register. This raises a question as to whether the statutory threshold for "identification" within the meaning of Macris has been met and if so, whether the third party's rights have been adequately protected.