In early February 2026, Islamist militants stormed the villages of Woro and Nuku in Nigeria’s Kwara State, killing more than 160 civilians in one of the deadliest attacks in Nigeria this year, enacting widespread killings, the sacking of property and the abduction of dozens of residents.
In the months that followed, the crisis escalated and by late April, militants suspected to be linked to Boko Haram issued an ultimatum threatening to execute 176 abducted women and children unless their demands were met by the Nigerian state.
While no formal list of demands was publicly articulated, reporting suggests the ultimatum was driven less by a coherent negotiating position and more by a practical constraint: the militants had taken a significant number of hostages and are now struggling to sustain them. Statements attributed to the group reference the burden of feeding captives, coupled with frustration at a slow and uncertain response from the Nigerian authorities.
The group receded from international focus following the death of its long-time leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, however subsequent analysis suggests this period functioned as more of a strategic pause during which elements of the group withdrew into the Lake Chad Basin to consolidate, reconstitute leadership structures, and adapt their operational model.
What has emerged is a more hybridised threat. Reporting indicates that Boko Haram factions have expanded further into criminal economies including human trafficking and weapons smuggling, but reverting to their old tactics of kidnap for ransom, may suggest that these revenue streams remain infantile.
Human Rights Watch has warned that attacks and assaults in Maiduguri demonstrate that civilians remain “dangerously exposed to deadly violence” despite years of military operations. Similarly, reporting by AP News highlights continued mass casualty incidents linked to Islamist militants across northeastern Nigeria.
The effectiveness of counterterrorism operations against the groups have also come under scrutiny. Nigerian airstrikes targeting insurgent positions have, in some cases, resulted in civilian casualties, prompting investigations and raising concerns over intelligence and targeting accuracy. As with other theatres across the Sahel, such incidents risk reinforcing the grievances that insurgent groups exploit for recruitment.
More broadly, Boko Haram’s resurgence must be understood within a regional context of converging instability. Analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations highlights the growing interconnection between extremist groups across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, with overlapping networks facilitating coordination and access to illicit markets.
This dynamic closely mirrors developments in Mali, as explored in our analysis on the recent attacks there. In both contexts, insurgent groups have demonstrated an ability not only to survive sustained military pressure, but to adapt to it, whether through geographic dispersal, operational coordination, or integration into other criminal economies.
Taken together, developments in Mali and Nigeria point to a more sobering reality: insurgent groups rarely disappear. Organisations once considered degraded have re-emerged with sufficient capacity to mount coordinated attacks and, once again, it is civilian populations who will bear the cost.