In brief
Five years after the Taliban's return to power, Afghanistan is moving from isolation towards greater diplomatic and economic engagement, with Russia's formal recognition, closer ties with India and China, and technical contacts with the EU. However, UN sanctions, ICC arrest warrants against senior Taliban leadership and a poorly integrated banking sector mean that normalisation is still a far cry from normality. Organisations considering Afghanistan-related transactions should continue to undertake robust sanctions screening, beneficial-ownership analysis, source-of-funds enquiries and enhanced due diligence into counterparties and their connections with the Taliban authorities.
On 15 August 2026, five years will have passed since the Taliban entered Kabul and re-established the self-declared Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan following the collapse of the internationally backed Afghan government.
At the time, the Taliban inherited a country facing economic collapse, the withdrawal of international development funding, frozen sovereign assets and near-total diplomatic isolation. No country formally recognised the new government and governments which had spent two decades fighting the Taliban faced a basic dilemma: how to engage with the organisation controlling Afghanistan without legitimising it.
Five years on, developments in Afghanistan suggest that much has changed on the surface while the underlying dynamics remain remarkably persistent.
As explored throughout our previous articles on Afghanistan, the Taliban has spent much of the period since 2021 attempting to reintegrate Afghanistan into regional trade and diplomatic networks, as well as lobbying for the unfreezing of their sovereign assets.
However, what initially consisted largely of engagement with neighbouring countries has gradually broadened into direct diplomatic visits, restored embassies and, in one case, formal recognition.
Russia became the first country formally to recognise the Taliban government in July 2025, only three months after, as noted in our April 2025 update, Moscow removed the Taliban from its list of designated terrorist organisations.
By May 2026, Russian officials were openly describing the relationship as a "full-fledged partnership", encompassing security, trade, cultural cooperation and humanitarian assistance, while encouraging other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to deepen their own engagement with Kabul.
The deepening security relationship also raises a more speculative question: whether Afghan fighters could eventually appear in Russia's war in Ukraine. After the signing of the partnership agreement, Kabul subsequently said that the agreement primarily concerns the repair and maintenance of Afghanistan's substantial inventory of Russian-made military equipment, and we do note that there is currently no verified evidence that Taliban personnel are being deployed to Ukraine.
Nevertheless, Russia has already demonstrated a willingness to supplement its forces with foreign manpower: North Korea deployed approximately 14,000–15,000 personnel to Russia following its deepening military partnership with Moscow, while nationals from a number of African and Asian countries have also been recruited into Russian forces. Moscow has simultaneously offered financial incentives to recruits, a model that could model could have particular resonance in Afghanistan.
GDP per capita in Afghanistan fell by 5.6% in 2025 as rapid population growth, mass returns from neighbouring countries and limited employment opportunities placed further pressure on household incomes.
Afghanistan's deteriorating economic conditions mean that a substantial pool of military-age men may be economically vulnerable to outside recruitment.
This remains hypothetical and would be politically very different from North Korea's state-organised deployment of troops. However, against the backdrop of formal Russian recognition, and terrible economic conditions in Afghanistan, the irony of foreign fighters being sent from Afghanistan to Russia is too interesting to ignore.
From Tokyo to Brussels
In February 2025, we examined the Taliban's first official diplomatic visit to a country outside Central Asia and the Middle East, when a delegation travelled to Japan to discuss humanitarian aid, economic cooperation and potential investment.
At the time, we noted that the visit could represent an early attempt to move Afghanistan beyond its immediate regional relationships and attract international investment into sectors including mining, agriculture and infrastructure.
That pattern has subsequently accelerated.
In October 2025, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi made the first visit to India by a senior Taliban official since the 2021 takeover. The trip required a temporary exemption from the United Nations travel ban applying to Muttaqi and included discussions on trade, healthcare, consular services and access to regional ports. India subsequently announced that it would upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to an embassy, while the Taliban indicated that Afghan diplomats would similarly return to New Delhi.
As also discussed in our October 2025 analysis, the rapprochement was particularly noteworthy against the backdrop of Afghanistan's rapidly deteriorating relationship with Pakistan. India and Pakistan remain strategic rivals, meaning Kabul's strengthening relationship with New Delhi inevitably carries a geopolitical dimension beyond ordinary diplomacy.
China, for its part, has continued its own engagement. Between 10 and 16 May 2026, China's Special Envoy on Afghan Affairs visited Afghanistan and held meetings with Foreign Minister Muttaqi and senior adviser to the Interior Minister Anas Haqqani, discussing bilateral relations and regional security.
Perhaps more surprising is the gradual shift in Europe. On 23 June 2026, the European Union hosted Taliban officials in Brussels for the first time since the group returned to power. Representatives from the European Commission and 15 EU states met a Taliban delegation to discuss the return and readmission of Afghan nationals without legal residence in Europe.
The European Commission stressed that the meeting was technical and did not constitute recognition of the Taliban government, however the optics are difficult to ignore.
This creates an increasingly important distinction for organisations dealing with Afghanistan: engagement is not recognition, and recognition is not sanctions relief.
The Taliban's international position has undoubtedly improved, but significant restrictions remain. In February 2026, the UN Security Council reaffirmed the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo applying to designated individuals and entities associated with the Taliban which constitute a threat to Afghanistan's peace, stability and security. As of April 2026, the UN's 1988 sanctions list contained 135 individuals and five entities.
For businesses, investors and financial institutions, increasing diplomatic engagement should therefore not be interpreted as evidence that conventional sanctions, anti-money laundering or counter-terrorist financing controls can be relaxed.
Recognition without reform
When we examined Russia's removal of the Taliban from its terrorist list in April 2025, we noted that the ‘Islamic Emirate’ appeared increasingly likely to achieve some form of international recognition despite continuing pressure over what UN officials and Afghan women's rights advocates have characterised as "gender apartheid".
And whilst subsequently their international engagement has increased substantially, the Taliban's treatment of women has not followed the same trajectory. Or rather, it has but in the inverse direction.
On 8 July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani. The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that both had committed the crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds against women, girls and others considered not to conform with Taliban policies on gender, gender identity or expression.
The warrants relate to gender persecution and represents one of the most significant attempts to impose individual international criminal responsibility on the Taliban leadership since their return to power.
In February 2026, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights criticised a new Taliban criminal procedures directive which he said further entrenched repression, legitimised violence against women and children in Afghanistan and then in June, UNAMA reported the detention of at least 30 women in Herat by Taliban morality officials and police for allegedly failing to comply with dress requirements.
The increasingly pronounced reality, therefore, is that the Taliban are receiving more international engagement and recognition without making any of the reforms which many governments once presented as prerequisites for normalisation.
Pakistan: from tension to war
The second major change over the past five years concerns Afghanistan's relationship with Pakistan. In January 2025, we noted that Pakistan, historically one of the Taliban's most important supporters, was increasingly at odds with the Taliban over Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of sheltering or failing adequately to restrain.
By October 2025, the dispute had escalated into direct fighting between the two countries, border crossings closed, trade was disrupted and hundreds of vehicles were reportedly stranded as the two governments exchanged strikes and attempted to negotiate temporary ceasefires.
That conflict has not gone away. On 28 June, UNAMA confirmed that Pakistani airstrikes killed at least 28 Afghan civilians. On 2 August, a suicide bombing near a police station in Pakistan's Swat region killed 17 people. The TTP claimed responsibility, and Pakistan continue to accuse the Afghan Taliban of enabling militant attacks from their territory.
Afghanistan between two wars
But, in the current geo-political landscape, Pakistan is not Afghanistan's only neighbour experiencing major conflict. To Afghanistan's west, Iran remains embroiled in its war with the United States and Israel, placing Kabul geographically between two major areas of regional instability.
The Taliban has attempted to maintain a cautious position and there is presently little evidence that the Taliban intends actively to enter the Iran war. The more significant risk is that Afghanistan becomes drawn into a wider regional conflict through geography rather than choice.
Afghanistan borders both Iran and Pakistan. Its trade routes, migration flows and energy supplies depend heavily on neighbouring states, while the Taliban is already engaged in direct military confrontation with Pakistan. Further destabilisation in Iran, renewed escalation with Pakistan, or the movement of armed groups and refugees across either frontier would place significant pressure on a government with limited financial resources and minimal conventional military capability.
Our assessment
Five years after the Taliban returned to power, Afghanistan presents a more complicated risk environment than simple descriptions such as "internationally isolated" may imply.
The direction of travel is clearly towards greater engagement. Russia has formally recognised the government. India has restored its embassy. China and the Gulf states maintain extensive dialogue with Kabul. European governments are increasingly willing to speak directly to Taliban representatives when migration or security considerations require it.
But normalisation should not be confused with normality. UN sanctions remain in place against numerous Taliban-linked individuals and entities, and Afghanistan's banking sector remains poorly integrated into the international financial system. Organisations considering Afghanistan-related transactions should therefore continue to undertake robust sanctions screening, beneficial-ownership analysis, source-of-funds enquiries and enhanced due diligence into counterparties and their connections with the Taliban authorities.
There are also significant human-rights and reputational considerations. The same government receiving foreign delegations and discussing investment is simultaneously subject to ICC arrest warrants against its senior leadership for alleged crimes against humanity of gender persecution.
The Taliban has obtained this increased engagement without substantially changing the policies towards women and girls which originally formed one of the principal international barriers to recognition. At the same time, it has moved from an insurgent movement fighting a domestic government to a state-like actor confronting Pakistan’s militarily and navigating an active war on its Iranian border.
Five years after the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan's defining geopolitical risk may therefore no longer be its isolation.
It may be that a government, which remains partially outside the international system, is becoming increasingly entangled in the diplomatic, commercial and military architecture surrounding it.