# Mr Mathias Cormann OECD Secretary- General

Ms Manal Corwin
Director - Centre for Tax Policy and Administration

Château la Muette F-75775 Paris

Cc: Council of Europe (T-PD); EU Council; EDPB

Mishcon de Reya

Africa House 70 Kingsway London WC2B 6AH DX 37954 Kingsway T: +44 20 3321 7000 www.mishcon.com

London | Cambridge | Oxford | Singapore

21 Oct 2025

Dear Mr Cormann and Ms Corwin

# AEOI | Security concerns relating to CRS data transmission

I am writing following to our -

# 1. Previous correspondence

#### Notably:

- Our complaint under the OECD's Data Protection Rules (see also here and here);
- Our complaint to the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL);
- The concerns raised by the WP29, the EU's erstwhile data protection working group;
- Our research concerning the data security risks of the Common Transmission System (CTS), the IT-system created and administered by the OECD for the transfer CRS data;
- Our previous correspondence (listed in the Annex and available here).

To date, we have not received any acknowledgements.

#### 2. Recent development

We are aware that at least one CRS participating jurisdiction confirmed the interruption of data transfers to a CRS partner "as the Global Forum is investigating a possible security incident". This is in addition to the incident previously reported relating to Bulgaria.

#### 3. Questions for the OECD

The CRS affects the data of millions of compliant taxpayers. I attach a 140-page long list of hacking and data breaches affecting tax authorities, central banks and other financial institutions. This is in addition to the concerns raised the WP29 in their letter.

Could I please ask you to confirm:

0	How many jurisdictions have been affected by data breaches concerning CRS data
0	How many jurisdictions have seen transfers blocked or suspended as a result of
	data security concerns
3	Whether the OECD has asked Member States for reassurances that they have not
	built "back-doors" or "Trojan horses" into the CTS (see our research)
4	Given that your predecessor concluded that the OECD does not owe any data
	protection duty to account holders, what safeguards it has built into the CTS to
	ensure the integrity of data uploaded, transferred and downloaded using the CTS.

Best regards,

#### Filippo Noseda

Partner

#### **Annex**

# Previous correspondence with the OECD regarding the CRS

#### **Data Protection**

- 1. Letters dated 11 May 2020 (data protection complaint under the OECD Rules)
- 2. Letter dated 28 July 2020 (complaint to CNIL)
- 3. Correspondence with your predecessor, the former Director of the OECD's Centre for Tax Policy and Administration and his Deputy.

### **Privacy**

4. Letter dated 17 September 2024 (Tax Authorities' Culture of Care tested)

# **Data Security**

- 5. Letter dated 23 September 2024 (Indonesian tax authorities data breach)
- 6. Letter dated 31 May 2024 (Santander Hack)
- 7. Letter dated 12 May 2024 (Europol Hack)
- 8. Letter dated 19 April 2024 (IMF Global Financial Stability Report)
- 9. Letter dated 28 July 2023 (ATO Hack)
- 10. Letter dated 26 April 2020 (IDES and CTS)

#### **Human Rights**

- 11. Letter dated 10 Aug 2023 (47 German MPs' human rights motion),
- 12. Letter dated 4 May 2022 (Exchange with Russia)

107670443.1 2

# Mıshcon de Reya

107670443.1 3