Agatha was a talented and well-loved young lawyer who joined us as a trainee in 2022 and qualified into our Reputation Protection and Crisis Management team in 2024, becoming an integral and well-loved member of the firm.

Emma Woollcott, Partner and Head of the Reputation Protection and Crisis Management team said:

"We are heartbroken. Everyone who knew Agatha will miss her tremendously. She was an extremely talented young lawyer, just at the beginning of what would have been a hugely successful and impactful career. We were very lucky to have worked with her. As our colleague and friend, she brought a warmth and energy to every situation and was a joy to spend time with. We hold Agatha and those who knew and loved her in our thoughts at this terribly difficult time."

• The Grand Board of Appeal at the EU Intellectual Property Office has refused trade mark protection for the signs ANIMAL FARM and 1984 in respect of content-related goods and services. The decision follows its rejection of the sign GEORGE ORWELL for similar goods and services in late 2025.
• There were a number of relevant factors behind the Grand Board's decision including the widespread fame of the books, their inclusion in education curricula, and their enduring popularity over several decades.
• While the decision does not rule out trade mark protection for titles of books/films etc, including famous ones, an applicant is required to show that the title would be perceived by the relevant public, not merely as designating the work itself, but primarily as an indication of the commercial origin of those goods or services.
• The Grand Board has called on EU legislators to consider creating EU-wide rights for work titles. This will raise interesting policy debates.   

What is the ANIMAL FARM/1984 case about?

The author George Orwell died in London on 21 January 1950 at the age of 46. As a result, many of his famous books – including Animal Farm and 1984 – entered the public domain in the EU and UK, for copyright purposes, on 1 January 2021.

In 2018, no doubt anticipating Orwell's books entering the public domain, the Estate of the Late Sonia Brownell Orwell filed trade mark applications at the EU Intellectual Property Office for ANIMAL FARM and 1984 (alongside an application for GEORGE ORWELL). The applications covered a range of goods and services including recorded/digital media, printed matter, games and playthings, and entertainment/education related services. Following objections by the EUIPO examiner on the grounds that the signs were descriptive of a characteristic, namely the subject matter or content of the relevant goods or services, the Estate made divisional applications for ANIMAL FARM and 1984 (which led to the marks being registered for a range of other goods and services e.g., clothing etc).

The applications for 'content carriers' and services were ultimately considered by the Grand Board of Appeal, which has recently issued its decision. In refusing registration, the Grand Board defined the decisive question as being – would the title in question be perceived by the relevant public, not merely as designating the work itself, but primarily as an indication of the commercial origin of those goods or services? The Grand Board decided the answer was 'no', in large part due to the fame and cultural significance of the two titles.

The Grand Board's decision on the two book titles followed its decision towards the end of 2025, when it found that the name GEORGE ORWELL itself also could not function as a trade mark for similar goods and services, again because it was descriptive of them. In the GEORGE ORWELL case, the Grand Board had adopted a 'subject matter' analysis for assessing famous names: if the relevant public would immediately understand the name as describing what the goods/services were about or what they contained, the sign would be descriptive and non-distinctive.

The Grand Board also said that relevant factors in this assessment would include: fame and recognition; widespread dissemination and adaptation of the works; social and cultural integration such as prizes, institutions and commemorations; the length of time the author has been known and had remained in public discourse; linguistic derivations (such as 'Orwellian'); and market reality. The Board therefore concluded that the sign GEORGE ORWELL would be perceived by an English-speaking public (i.e., in Ireland and Malta) as an immediate reference to the author, and as an indication that the goods and services were about him. 

The ANIMAL FARM / 1984 decision

Descriptive of goods and services relating to carrying content, and non-distinctive

The Grand Board found both ANIMAL FARM and 1984 to be descriptive of the relevant goods and services. The relevant public (again, the English-speaking Irish and Maltese public), would immediately recognise the signs as titles of the well-known literary works, taking into account the longevity, dissemination and cultural impact of the works. The Grand Board pointed out that the more popular or well known a literary work is, the more likely it was that its title would be readily recognised as referring to that work. It rejected the argument that this had the effect of treating the fame of the book as an arbitrary factor against registration, drawing a distinction between the reputation of a trade mark as opposed to the notoriety of a creation of the mind. 

In particular:

• ANIMAL FARM had a high degree of recognition among the relevant public, and a clear conceptual meaning as the title of the famous novel. It had been described as "the most famous by far of all twentieth-century political allegories", signalling a significant degree of recognition, dissemination and significance of the work in society as a political allegory or fable. This was reinforced by other factors such as its prominence in an educational context; its wide dissemination through film, TV and theatre; and the passage of time since it had been published. Meanwhile, its narrative complexity was not a relevant factor in the assessment of the relevant public's perception of the sign.
• For similar reasons, 1984 enjoyed a particularly high degree of recognition among the relevant public. Again, the Grand Board concluded that it had acquired, in the perception of the relevant public, a clear and immediately recognisable conceptual meaning such that a significant part of that public would readily understand the sign as referring to the famous novel and its underlying political themes.

The Grand Board therefore concluded that both marks provided direct information as to the subject matter of the contested goods and services, and were descriptive. Further, they also lacked distinctiveness in relation to the relevant goods and services, again because they would be primarily perceived by relevant consumers as the titles of, or a reference to, George Orwell's famous novels.

What impact did copyright protection have?

The Estate argued that, as the novels were subject to copyright protection (at the time of filing the applications), the Grand Board should take into account the EUIPO Guidelines which state that, where copyright subsists, there is a presumption of good faith and the mark should, in principle, be accepted for registration.

The Grand Board indicated that the existence or absence of copyright protection may have a bearing on whether a designation is liable to be seen as descriptive of content or character, but it would not be determinative. Copyright could provide contextual background but could not, on its own, confer or preclude distinctive character. Indeed, once copyright has expired, this may lead to multiple adaptations reaching a wide audience, thereby strengthening the immediate association between the sign and the underlying work and its themes. This tends to suggest that trade mark applications for a book title should be made well in advance of expiry of copyright in the book itself.

Were the Estate's commercial activities relevant?

The Estate also relied upon its commercial activities in managing George Orwell's works, including Animal Farm and 1984. In particular, it relied upon the controls it puts in place on adaptations of the works through contractual arrangements. However, the Grand Board said these controls had little bearing on how consumers would perceive the contested signs given that commercial or licensing arrangements were not, as a rule, known to the public.

Other considerations

Given the outcome on descriptiveness/distinctiveness, the following aspects were considered on an obiter basis:

• The proposed marks were not contrary to public policy or accepted principles of morality. In particular, it would not desecrate George Orwell's prestige or renown to register the title of one of his main works as a trade mark.
• They were also not customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practice of the trade for goods and services. Such an objection could however perhaps arise in another case – for example, where a title has been used to a significant extent as a common term to designate books themselves or books with certain characteristics.
• The titles also could not consist of a characteristic which gives substantial value to the goods.
• Finally, the marks were not misleading simply because the applicant was neither the author, their heir, or the holder of any copyright.

What book titles have been registered as trade marks?

Despite the outcome in this case, titles of books and films remain registrable. Further, the fame of a literary work is not, in itself, a ground for refusing registration. The key to registered trade mark protection is in demonstrating that the sign applied for has an indication of origin function in respect of the relevant goods/services, i.e., it has distinctive character. According to the Grand Board, a title will only fulfil the requisite trade mark function if the relevant public perceive it as departing from its primary descriptive role, and that it is "understood, first and foremost, as an indicator of origin."

The Estate had pointed to the fact that there are a number of book titles that have been successfully registered as trade marks for similar goods and services – in the EU these include GOLDFINGER, OLIVER TWIST, WINNIE THE POOH, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE, THE DA VINCI CODE, PETER PAN, and THE HOBBIT. However, on the other side of the line, a number of book titles have been treated as descriptive for certain types of goods and services. Alongside now ANIMAL FARM and 1984, these include: THE JUNGLE BOOK, PINOCCHIO, THE DIARY OF ANNE FRANK (in Belgium and the UK), and various titles of books by Hans Christian Andersen (in Denmark). The UKIPO also in 2022 upheld objections against registration of ANIMAL FARM and 1984 in respect of similar goods and services (but, as with the EUIPO, allowed registration in respect of other goods and services).

Can book titles be protected as copyright works or in other ways?

Under both EU and UK law, a book title may be protectable as a copyright work. To do so, however, it would be necessary to show that the title meets the originality test, requiring that it is the author's own intellectual creation. In this case, the Executive Director of the EUIPO suggested that, where a title includes invented or fanciful terms related to the story or characters, it is more likely that it will meet the originality requirement. In each case, it will require an assessment as to whether the originality test has been met.

Alternative protections may be available in particular jurisdictions, including unfair competition law (passing off in the UK), or a sui generis form of protection (as in Germany and France).

Comment

The Grand Board concluded its decision in the ANIMAL FARM / 1984 case by recommending that the EU legislator consider whether an EU-wide right for work titles should be created. Whether this is an appropriate policy decision in light of the time-limited term of protection for copyright works (compared to potentially unlimited protection for registered trade marks) will be an interesting point of debate.

Meanwhile, the Grand Board's decision refusing registration for GEORGE ORWELL is under appeal to the EU General Court, and it seems likely that the Estate will therefore also appeal this latest decision. It is worth noting that the Grand Board's decision focuses only on inherent distinctiveness and so it is possible that, in other cases, an applicant may be able to demonstrate that the relevant signs have acquired distinctiveness as a result of the use that has been made of them.

• In Pandora Jewellery UK Ltd & Anr v EML Payments Europe Ltd [2026] EWHC 1047 (Comm), the High Court dismissed retailers' claims that they were entitled to post-termination payments of expired funds on their gift cards, ruling that the payment services provider could retain the funds instead.
• A specific express provision overrode a general provision that the retailer relied on to claim post-termination payments.
• The court emphasised that its role is not to rewrite clear contractual language based on what might appear fair and reasonable, even where one party gets an unexpected windfall.

The facts

In March 2011, the claimant (Pandora) and defendant (EML) entered into an agreement by which EML agreed to implement a gift card scheme for use in Pandora's retail stores and online. Under the agreement, funds collected from customers by Pandora were initially paid into a deposit account and were then transferred to a scheme account, where they were held on trust by EML.

The cards expired after 12 months, after which any remaining balance could no longer be used by the customer. These "expired funds" were to be paid to Pandora as "breakage payments" until termination of the agreement. The agreement expired on 31 March 2024, but a transition period and run-off period were put in place to allow for the scheme to be wound down.

EML made a payment to Pandora on 18 April 2024 for breakage payments that had accrued before 31 March 2024. However, no payments were made in respect of breakage payments accruing during the transition period and run-off period. Pandora issued proceedings for those sums, but EML contended that under the terms of the agreement it was entitled to keep the funds for itself and sought reverse summary judgment.

The key clauses

Section 2.2.g provided that:

Upon the expiry of a Gift Card, … [the Expired Funds] will be remitted to [EML] from the Gift Card Account and paid to [the claimant] in accordance with the Breakage Payment as outlined in Fee Schedule D.

Fee Schedule D specified that:

For the period commencing on the … Commencement Date through the termination of this Agreement (the 'Breakage Payment Period'), [EML] will pay [Pandora] an amount equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the Expired Funds … The Breakage Payments will terminate upon termination of this Agreement.

Section 7.3 of the agreement dealt with the transition period and run-off period, and provided that:

Upon termination of this Agreement, the [scheme] will continue to operate for a transition period … up to and including the 30th September 2024 (the 'Transition Period') in order for the parties to wind down the [scheme]. During the Transition Period, the [scheme] will continue to operate in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. For clarification the Transition Period is not a part of the term of the Agreement, but rather a post-termination service…

c.  Run-off. The parties will cooperate to run-off the existing Card Accounts over time in an orderly fashion until the Card Accounts have a zero balance. During the run-off, redemptions on the Cards at the Distributor Locations will continue to be settled and the Expiry Date will continue to be assessed against the Card. …

Under section 7.4, section 7.3 survived termination of the agreement, and section 2.2.g survived "during and as required for the run-off".

The judgment

As Judge Baumgartner noted, the legal principles relating to the construction of contracts are now well established. The court must ascertain objectively, with the benefit of the admissible background, the meaning of the words that the parties have used.

In this case, the judge noted that, while section 2.2.g read in isolation might give the impression that expired funds would always be paid to Pandora, it was only a general provision – it did not provide the claimant with a free-standing or unqualified right to receive expired funds. Instead, EML's obligation to pay was expressly conditioned by and referable to the breakage payment regime set out in Fee Schedule D, which provided in clear and unqualified terms that breakage payments would terminate upon termination of the agreement.

Judge Baumgartner rejected Pandora's argument that sections 7.3 and 7.4 extended EML's payment obligations beyond termination. Whilst section 2.2.g survived termination "during and as required for the run-off", that did not enlarge or alter its substantive content – it continued to operate according to its terms. The fact that section 7.3.c required the parties to cooperate "until the card accounts have a zero balance" also did not compel a different conclusion.

While this construction may result in a "contractual bounty" for EML, the fact that it was a surprising or commercially unreasonable result did not justify departing from the clear language of the agreement. The court's task was to interpret the bargain the parties made, not the bargain they might be thought to have made.

The judge also rejected Pandora's further argument that EML held the expired funds on resulting trust. Whilst, pursuant to the agreement, the card funds were to be held in the scheme account by EML as trustee, section 2.2.g expressly permitted expired funds to be remitted to EML. Once that occurred, the trust was discharged. Any obligation to make a breakage payment thereafter was purely contractual.

Key takeaways

• As this decision emphasises, under English law, plain language prevails in commercial contracts.
• Even where an agreement delivers an apparently unintended windfall to one party, the courts will not invoke business common sense to depart from clear and unambiguous contractual drafting.
• It is therefore vital to give clear consideration to the commercial implications of contractual terms at the outset, rather than seeking to rely on arguments of commercial reasonableness at a later stage.
• The interaction between general operative clauses and specific provisions must also be considered carefully, as inconsistencies between the two are likely to be resolved in favour of the specific provision. For retailers, this decision is a helpful reminder that, when entering into payment services and gift card arrangements, they cannot assume that expired customer funds will automatically be returned to the retailer.

In most cases, British citizens are now expected to enter the UK using a valid British passport, or a Certificate of Entitlement to the right of abode.

This represents a big change for many dual nationals who have previously travelled using a non-British passport. Changes to carrier checks mean that individuals without a current British passport may now face delays, or may even not be permitted to board.

It is also important to factor in timing. Applications for British passports can sometimes take several weeks, or longer in more complex cases, for example where there are differences in personal details, such as the spelling of a name between passports. Timeframes to get a Certificate of Entitlement also vary.

There are some limited and temporary exceptions, including for certain people with Settled Status issued under the EU Settlement Scheme and, in some cases, where expired British passports may be accepted, all subject to strict conditions.

However, these concessions are not guaranteed and remain subject to carrier approval.

It is imperative that British citizens ensure they have the appropriate documentation before traveling to the UK.

Before founding Social-Ability, John worked as a corporate lawyer at Linklaters. He ultimately chose to leave law behind to build a company focused on improving the lives of people living with dementia through joyful, interactive, light-based activities designed to bring connection, engagement and wellbeing into care settings. 

Alongside his work at Social-Ability, John regularly delivers workshops on how to live well with dementia and supports a number of organisations at board level in their efforts to improve dementia care. He is also a member of the UK’s National Standards Committee on Ageing Societies. 

Founded by John, Social-Ability is dedicated to revolutionising care through innovative, activity-based experiences that help people living with dementia lead more joyful and meaningful lives. 

Mishcon de Reya, an international law firm with more than 650 lawyers globally, operating at the intersection of complex disputes, global capital and economic transformation, today announced the official opening of its Dubai office, further strengthening the firm's operations in the UAE.

As Gulf economies diversify and cross-border capital flows increase in volume and complexity, businesses and investors in the region require legal partners capable of advising across multiple jurisdictions and regulatory frameworks simultaneously. The firm's practices in Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) and Dubai are structured to do exactly that, advising clients across the UAE.

Mishcon de Reya's new Dubai office is located at One Za’abeel, one of the city’s most prominent commercial destinations. Established within the Dubai World Trade Centre (DWTC) Free Zone ecosystem, the office provides the firm with a strategically positioned base in the heart of Dubai’s central business district, supporting its continued growth across the UAE and wider region.

DWTC Free Zone is a competitive business ecosystem and licensing jurisdiction that connects companies to markets across the Middle East and beyond. Home to more than 2,700 companies spanning regional and international markets, it offers an enabling environment for global businesses seeking a strong operational presence in Dubai. Mishcon de Reya’s establishment within the free zone reflects its long-term commitment to the UAE and reinforces Dubai’s continued appeal as a global hub for investment, innovation and cross-border commerce.

Mishcon de Reya's new Dubai office will work closely with the rest of the firm, including MDR Mayfair, which it will continue its close relation and co-location with. The office will service clients across a range of practice areas, including corporate, dispute resolution, employment, real estate, private wealth, impact, and innovation.

Christopher Skipper, Managing Partner, UAE, said: "It is a pleasure to announce the opening of our office in the landmark building of One Za'abeel. We have been advising clients in this region for over 30 years. The UAE continues to provide an attractive ecosystem for families, investors and businesses, and this announcement further highlights our commitment to and confidence in the UAE as a significant global financial centre."

James Libson, Managing Partner, said: “We are delighted to open our office in Dubai and provide a base from which to service our clients' needs. Our presence in One Za’abeel underlines our commitment to the region and our international ambitions.”

Abdalla Al Banna, Vice President of Free Zone Regulatory Operations at DWTC Free Zone, said: “The establishment of Mishcon de Reya’s Dubai office within DWTC Free Zone underscores Dubai’s growing appeal as a global hub for business, investment and cross-border advisory services. At DWTC Free Zone, we are committed to enabling international companies through a business-friendly regulatory framework, strategic location and a connected ecosystem that supports long-term growth. We are pleased to welcome Mishcon de Reya and look forward to supporting the firm’s continued success.”

The opening forms part of Mishcon de Reya's Vision 2030 strategy, a five-year plan centred on three sectors where the firm has deep heritage and a growing client base. These include private wealth and private capital, the innovation economy, and real estate, alongside its commitment to remaining a disputes powerhouse, all of which are areas of significant and growing activity across the Gulf.

Drawing on lessons from its international expansion across Singapore and Hong Kong, and with its significant client base in the region, the Dubai office represents the next phase of Mishcon de Reya’s growth in the UAE, building on the firm’s existing operational presence in Abu Dhabi and strengthening its capabilities in line with client demand.

As a writer of historical fiction, Louisa Treger explores not only the historical record but also the rich emotional lives of her characters. In her previous novels, she has brought to life the little-known stories of Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Courtauld, Nellie Bly and Dora Maar. In her fifth book, A Fatal Love, published on 27 August by Bloomsbury, she turns to the story of Ruth Ellis, the last woman to be hanged in Britain.

Although these women are rooted in specific moments in history, they continue to fascinate us because of their deeply human stories - stories with which we can still empathise today.

Like many women before and after her, Ruth suffered within a physically abusive relationship with David Blakely. Was it her vulnerability following the breakdown of her marriage that made her more likely to endure such treatment? And what is the “right” way to rebuild one’s life after divorce?

In this talk, Louisa Treger and Sandra Davis draw on Ruth Ellis’s story, on the lives of the other women Louisa has written about, and on their own personal experiences to explore the emotional impact of divorce. Together, they consider how it is possible not only to rebuild a life, but ultimately to thrive.

• Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) purchase insolvency practitioner bonds (IP Bonds) to cover claims arising from the appointments they take on. These IP Bonds specifically cover claims for losses caused by fraud or dishonesty on the part of the IP.
• As the appointments that the IPs take on are not known at the time the bonds are issued, the bonds are issued for the benefit of the IPs' regulating bodies (the Regulators). In Nicholson v Insolvency Practitioners Association the High Court considered the basis on which the Regulators hold these IP Bonds.
• The court concluded that IP Bonds are held on trust for the estates of the insolvent companies that the IPs have been appointed over. Accordingly, these companies are entitled to claim under the IP Bonds assigned to them.
• It also confirmed that these companies' rights under the bonds are "property" for the purposes of section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Therefore, the Regulators can be compelled to transfer them at the request of subsequently appointed IPs (Successor IPs).
• As a result, companies and Successor IPs will now have a clear route to pursuing claims under IP Bonds where previous IPs have acted improperly.

Overview

IPs are entrusted with great responsibility when appointed over an insolvent company. As a result, fraudulent or dishonest conduct on their part can cause significant harm to the companies they are appointed over.

To mitigate this risk, and provide insolvent estates with a route to recover losses caused by such behaviour, IPs are expected to take out IP Bonds. The High Court's judgment in Nicholson v Insolvency Practitioners Association [2026] EWHC 686 (Ch) has resolved an important uncertainty as to who can enforce these bonds and on what basis, with significant practical consequences for insolvent estates and successor office-holders.

The decision in Nicholson strengthens the position of such companies and their Successor IPs. The clarification of their status as the beneficiaries of a bare trust makes clear that they have the authority to direct the way in which the bondholder Regulators pursue and enforce those rights on their behalf.

What is an insolvency practitioner bond and who benefits from it?

What is an IP Bond?

IP Bonds are a statutory protection for insolvent estates against fraud or dishonesty. IPs are required to obtain a bond under the Insolvency Practitioner Regulations 2005.

IP Bonds are effectively insurance bonds. As set out in the Insolvency Service Guidance on IP Bonds:

"The bond makes the surety (the insurer who issued the bond) jointly liable with the insolvency practitioner for losses in relation to the insolvent estate caused by the fraud or dishonesty of the insolvency practitioner (whether acting alone or in collusion), or the fraud or dishonesty of any person committed with the connivance of the insolvency practitioner."

As such, they are different from professional indemnity insurance that IPs may also have, which covers professional negligence on the part of an IP.

Who Benefits from an IP Bond?

However, although IP Bonds protect the companies that IPs are appointed over, they are to the Regulator responsible for the relevant IP. This is because when they are issued it is not known what companies the IP will be appointed over.

As a result of this structure, the following question arises: Who controls the right to claim under an IP Bond?

Because they are held by the Regulators, there has been a degree of uncertainty as to who can enforce claims under IP Bonds, and on what basis. In particular, historically they have not been treated as estate assets for the companies over which an IP is appointed. The accepted position has been that it is for the bondholder (i.e., the relevant Regulator) to decide whether and to what extent to pursue a claim under a bond, or alternatively to assign the claim to a company with a claim against the IP.

This was the approach adopted by the bondholder in Nicholson.

The parties' positions

The Regulator argued that it was entitled to determine how claims under the IP Bonds should be enforced. It submitted that:

"its practice is to encourage [Successor IPs] (in this case the Claimants) and the Surety (in this case Intact) to negotiate and agree a sum of money to be paid by the Surety to the SIPs for the benefit of the creditors claiming in the relevant insolvency estate. Once the sum is agreed a tripartite agreement is entered into between the Surety, the SIPs and the IPA (“Tripartite Agreement”) providing for the agreed sum to be paid by the Surety to the SIPs, which is then distributed by the SIPs to the creditors of the relevant insolvency estate."

However, in this case, settlement discussions between the surety and the Successor IPs reached a stalemate. The Successor IPs argued that they were effectively blocked from pursuing these claims by the Regulator's refusal to either pursue them itself or assign the benefit of the claims under the IP Bonds to them to pursue.

The Successor IPs therefore applied to the court for a declaration that: the IP Bonds were held on trust for the insolvency estates of the companies over which the IPs were appointed; and, as such, they were property of the companies which the Successor IPs were entitled to take possession of. They further argued that an order to that effect could be made under section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

The regulators hold bond rights on trust

The Court agreed with the Successor IPs. It held that IP Bonds are held by the Regulators on trust for the companies over which the IPs are appointed.

The court considered several issues in reaching this conclusion. First, whether the Regulators are fulfilling a public function by holding the bonds. The judge held that the Regulators hold the bonds voluntarily. There is no "direct statutory obligation" on the Regulators requiring them to do so. Further, the judge was not persuaded that the government would have been obliged to undertake this role if the Regulators had declined to do so. Finally, they concluded that the "functions and powers" of the Regulators in respect of the bonds were "not public functions and powers". On this basis, the judge concluded that the regulatory bodies are not fulfilling a public function by holding the bonds.

Having reached this conclusion, the judge considered whether the Regulators hold claim rights under the IP Bonds on trust for the insolvent estates. The judge concluded that the Regulators entered into the bonds "to benefit the insolvency estates which incurred losses as a result of the fraud or dishonesty of its IP members". They also held that the Regulators must "have an implied fiduciary or contractual duty to act in the best interests of the insolvency estates". Finally, they concluded that (in the absence of any public duty) a trust must exist in order to create a legal obligation on the Regulators to ensure that claims under the bonds can be pursued, and compensation obtained, by the relevant insolvent estates. The judge was also satisfied that all the legal requirements for a trust to exist were met. Accordingly, they held that IP Bonds are held by the Regulators on trust for the insolvent estates.

Section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986 gives office-holders a statutory route to compel transfer

The judge also considered whether claim rights under IP Bonds are "property" of the relevant insolvent estates for the purposes of section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

Section 234 grants IPs statutory rights to compel third parties to deliver up any property of the insolvent entities that they hold. These rights can be enforced by application to the Court if needed. The Regulator sought to argue that the claim rights were not "property" that could be subject to section 234, as they were rights that had to be assigned before they became the property of the insolvent estates.

The judge rejected this argument. They held that, as the insolvent estates are the beneficial owners of the claim rights under trust, the rights were their property. Accordingly, the regulatory body could be compelled to transfer them to the insolvent estates under section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

What this means in practice for office-holders and successor IPs

This judgment has several important practical consequences for Successor IPs and insolvent estates.

Regulators cannot refuse to pursue or assign claim rights under IP Bonds where an insolvent estate has a valid claim. As a result, IPs will be able to drive claims under IP Bonds at their own pace and in the manner they consider appropriate. Where a Regulator refuses to cooperate, section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides a direct statutory route to compel transfer of the claim rights. The court's jurisdiction under section 234 can be invoked at the Successor IPs' discretion.

This decision establishes a clear legal framework for enforcing IP Bond claims and removes a potential obstacle to recovery for creditors of insolvent estates.

• The High Court has granted a website blocking injunction requiring major UK internet service providers (ISPs), such as BT, Virgin and Sky, to block websites selling counterfeit and unlicensed versions of Novo Nordisk's semaglutide and other prescription-only medicines.
• This is the first website blocking application concerned with the supply of counterfeit and unlicensed prescription-only medicinal products.
• The wrongdoing included advertising and offering for sale of unlicensed prescription-only medicines, which is a criminal offence under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012, as well as IP infringements.
• The court confirmed that the blocking injunction jurisdiction is not confined to intellectual property rights and extends to both civil and criminal wrongdoing, including regulatory offences.

What is a blocking injunction?

A website blocking injunction is an order requiring ISPs to prevent their subscribers from accessing specified websites. Rather than targeting the operators of infringing or unlawful websites directly - who are often anonymous, located overseas and beyond practical reach - a blocking injunction is directed at the ISPs through whose networks UK consumers access those sites and who are unwittingly mixed up in the wrongdoing. Blocking injunctions can have immense practical utility, particularly given their ability to tackle sources of unlawful material where other enforcement methods have failed and where mirror websites may be expected to arise.

Blocking injunctions were initially developed in the copyright context under section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 in relation to pirated music. The Supreme Court in Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Others then extended the principle to trade mark infringement under the court's inherent jurisdiction. In Nintendo v BT & Others, the court extended the jurisdiction further to include the blocking of websites offering for sale and distributing circumvention devices designed to circumvent the technological protection measures within the Nintendo Switch console, whose purpose is to prevent piracy and the playing of unauthorised and infringing games (Mishcon acted for Nintendo - we reported on this here: Nintendo obtains novel blocking injunction). The recent Novo Nordisk case takes that extension further still.

The legal test for a blocking injunction

The threshold requirements for an order are that: (i) the ISPs are intermediaries; (ii) either the users or the operators of the website are infringing the claimant's rights or committing a legal wrong; (iii) the users or operators are using the services of the ISPs; and (iv) the ISPs have actual knowledge of this.

Once jurisdiction is established, the court must be satisfied that the order is proportionate. The injunction must be necessary, effective, dissuasive, not unduly costly or complicated, must avoid barriers to legitimate trade, strike a fair balance between the fundamental rights engaged, be proportionate and be safeguarded against abuse. Proportionality is the key consideration. To ensure proportionality, it is appropriate to include safeguards in the order, such as a sunset clause (bringing the block to an end or requiring further review) and obligations to notify affected website operators.

The Novo Nordisk case: a novel application

Semaglutide is the active ingredient in Novo Nordisk's diabetes and anti-obesity medications, marketed under registered trade marks including OZEMPIC, RYBELSUS and WEGOVY.  These products have been enormously successful; global sales of GLP-1 products in 2024 exceeded £17 billion. That commercial success has attracted a proliferation of potentially dangerous fakes.

Although semaglutide is not a generic medicine, and Novo Nordisk holds regulatory exclusivity until 2031, the popularity of these products has led to: outright counterfeits labelled as OZEMPIC or other Novo Nordisk brands; third-party manufactured unlicensed versions marketed under their international non-proprietary names; and products substituting a different substance or dosage altogether, such as insulin.

Routine applications for blocking injunctions are often decided on the papers, but this application was listed for a hearing owing to two unusual but related features. First, it was the first blocking injunction application concerned with counterfeit and unlicensed prescription-only medicinal products. Second, one of the legal wrongs relied upon - the advertising and offering for sale of unlicensed prescription-only medicines, a criminal offence under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 - had not previously been considered in relation to such injunctions. This was in addition to the trade mark infringement and passing off claims.

Criminal wrongdoing as the foundation

The court accepted that each of the target websites was committing a number of criminal offences under the 2012 Regulations, wherever they advertised, offered to sell and sold unauthorised medicinal products. These included selling unauthorised medicinal products (contrary to regulation 46), supplying prescription-only medicines without a valid prescription (contrary to regulations 214 and 220), and publishing unlawful advertisements (contrary to regulations 279 and 284).

Critically, the court held that any form of civil or criminal wrongdoing will suffice to ground the court's jurisdiction, because that jurisdiction derives from ordinary principles of equity under which there is no relevant distinction between being mixed up in a civil or a criminal wrong. The Novo Nordisk decision is the first to apply this principle to pharmaceutical regulatory offences in a blocking injunction application.

The MHRA's involvement

The UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) had itself attempted, without success, to bring the websites down and had accordingly sought Novo Nordisk's assistance - a request which ultimately prompted the application. The court drew on this regulatory support in concluding that Novo Nordisk had the necessary standing to seek the injunction.

Public health and proportionality

The court placed significant weight on the public health dimension. Falsified products may not have been manufactured to the same quality-control standards, potentially containing impurities and allergens. For example, Novo Nordisk's evidence to a US Senate Committee identified over 300 serious health issues, 100 hospitalisations and 10 deaths linked to falsified semaglutide products. Meanwhile, the World Health Organisation has warned that substandard or fake products sold online could cause as many as one million deaths annually, with and that 50% of medicines sold online may not be genuine.

The court also noted that blocking was likely to be highly effective, with previous cases indicating average reductions in UK visitors of 98%, notwithstanding attempts to circumvent orders. It also accepted that, without a blocking order, the situation would likely devolve into a game of "whack-a-mole" as sites moved to mirror or replacement locations and resumed operations.

Comment

Novo Nordisk is significant for several reasons:

• The court accepted that blocking can protect the public from dangerous medicinal products and assists in protecting the value of rights and investment in developing and promoting useful medicines.
• It confirms that the blocking injunction jurisdiction is broad enough to encompass criminal regulatory wrongdoing under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012, not merely IP infringement.
• It establishes a precedent for pharmaceutical and life sciences companies to deploy this remedy against illicit online sellers of counterfeit (and other unlicensed prescription-only) medicines.
• It demonstrates that regulatory support and involvement - in this case from the MHRA - can assist in establishing standing and persuading the court of the merits of an application; companies seeking to pursue enforcement in this area should engage the regulator early.
• While the application addressed a new form of online wrongdoing, the court was satisfied that the order was proportionate for essentially similar reasons to those accepted in Cartier, Nintendo, and other website blocking cases, underscoring the flexibility of the framework.
• Brand owners facing online counterfeiting at scale should consider blocking injunctions as a primary enforcement tool alongside traditional IP remedies, particularly where the counterfeit products carry a public health risk.

How Mishcon de Reya can help

For more information on blocking injunctions, please get in touch with our IP Enforcement team, who advise on the protection and enforcement of IP and related rights, across a range of sectors and technologies.

The talk marks the first public presentation of their Pride parade project thus far, opening up material not previously shared. Bex sets out both historical and current conditions, including visibility, risk, and the role of corporate involvement, showing how these images shape how Pride is understood today. The talk introduces the wider project and its reach, closing with a direct question about what the future of Pride holds.

• Godwin v Godwin concerned a burial dispute between two brothers and raised important questions about the use of AI in witness statement preparation.
• The court directed that their father be buried in England, confirming that a deceased's expressed wishes are significant but not determinative, the overriding concern is disposal with proper respect and without unnecessary delay.
• AI-assisted witness statements drew judicial criticism, with the court giving them less weight as it could not be satisfied they were in the witnesses' own words.
• Consider will validity early in any burial dispute; the court retains broad discretion; and AI should be used with caution in witness statement preparation, with original drafts retained.

Background to the burial dispute

Michael Godwin (Mr Godwin) died on 5 November 2025. He was survived by his two sons, William and Jason, a third son having pre-deceased him.

The case arose out of a dispute between the two brothers as to how Mr Godwin's body would be disposed of: William wanted Mr Godwin to be cremated following a ceremony in England, whereas Jason sought a Christian funeral and then for Mr Godwin to be buried in Hargeville Cemetery, in France, or alternatively some other cemetery in the South of France.

After his retirement, Mr Godwin had lived in the South of France for around 30 years. However, he had never fully integrated into French life, not speaking the language and having few friends there.

On 25 April 2003, whilst in hospital for a heart procedure, Mr Godwin had handwritten a will expressing a wish for his body to be: "interred in the plot reserved from me at the cemetery in Hargeville…France, with Arlette attending”.

'Arlette' was his then partner, Arlette Thomas, who had reserved burial plots in Hargeville cemetery for her and Mr Godwin - Hargeville being the area where her family was from.  However, their relationship had ended some 15 years before his death, the plot which she had reserved for Mr Godwin was no longer available and Hargeville was not somewhere Mr Godwin himself was connected to, it being around 600 miles from where he had made his home in the South of France.

Notwithstanding this, an image of Hargeville was found among MrGodwin's papers, seemingly printed after his split from Ms Thomas and bearing the caption: "This is church for my funeral. In the graveyard I have a plot I share with Arlette Thomas adjacent to the Thomas family grave. Please bury me there."

The brothers' respective positions

William wanted Mr Godwin to be cremated on the basis that:

• his mother and brother (Mr Godwin's other son) had both been cremated;
• a cremation is cheaper than a burial and he was concerned that the funds in the estate may not cover a burial, on top of its other debts; and
• a cremation could be organised more quickly than a burial in either country.

He opposed a burial in Hargeville on the basis that the family had no connection to it, the plot reserved for Mr Godwin was no longer available and there was a chance that Ms Thomas may not even be buried there in the future. He also stated that he would not attend any funeral in Hargeville.

Jason wanted Mr Godwin to have a Christian funeral and be buried in Hargeville (or some other cemetery in the South of France), on the basis that:

• he wanted to give effect to Mr Godwin's wishes;
• France is the place he most closely associated with Mr Godwin, and where he had made his most lasting memories of him; and
• an attended funeral would allow him to properly pay his respects to his father  

He opposed a cremation for both religious (Jason being a Seventh Day Adventist) and emotional reasons, feeling that he could not properly commemorate his father without a marked grave and saying that he could not think of his father being cremated.

The Decision

As no grant of representation had yet been made, and the judge was uncertain whether the 2003 will would be valid under French law, or would entitle William to take a grant of representation in England and Wales, he considered parties were equally entitled to a grant of administration. He therefore appointed William as administrator under section 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, with this authority limited to dealing with the disposal of Mr Godwin's body.

This is a notable conclusion for the judge to have reached, as ordinarily if there is a will, then the authority of the executor appointed in the will (including their authority to dispose of the body of the Deceased) derives from the will itself, rather than from any grant of representation. If the will was valid and validly appointed William as executor, then he had the power to deal with the disposal of the body. However relatively little (if any) consideration was given to the potential validity of the will, perhaps because the two brothers were both unrepresented and may not have been aware of this point.

In addition, the judge directed that Mr Godwin would be buried in England following a Christian funeral there, on the basis that he considered that a Christian funeral and burial reflected Mr Godwin's wishes. Burial in France would risk delay and uncertainty, there was no family connection to Hargeville and Mr Godwin's grave was unlikely to be visited if he was buried there. There was also a possibility that a French funeral would have little meaning given the likelihood that none of the mourners would speak French.

In making his decision, the judge gave consideration to the principle that the court's overriding focus in such cases should be to ensure that a body is disposed of with "all proper respect and decency and without any unnecessary delay" (per Hartshorne v. Gardner [2008] EWHC 3765 (Ch)) and followed the dicta in Oldham MBC v Makin [2018] Ch 543 that whilst the deceased's own wishes were a weighty factor, they were not determinative.

It is notable for the judge to direct what actions should occur, despite appointing William on a limited grant to deal with this issue, as it seems somewhat redundant to appoint someone to make such decisions, but then tell them what decisions they must make. Questions arise as to whether the outcome may have been different had the parties had legal representation in court, rather than acting as litigants in person.

Use of AI

Both Jason and his ex-wife had submitted witness statements to the court, which, on their own admission they had had "limited assistance from a 'digital assistant'" in drafting. They claimed that they had drafted the initial drafts themselves but then used ChatGPT (the 'digital assistant' in question) for "grammar, spelling, and 'presentation'", with ChatGPT not adding, removing or re-arranging any words when compared to their first drafts.

The judge expressed several concerns about this use of AI, including that, in their view, there was "no good reason" for either Jason or his ex-wife to have used it, given that they both struck the judge as "sophisticated people"; that referring to ChatGPT as a 'digital assistant' was unconventional and raised concerns that the extent of AI involvement was being obscured.  No first drafts of the statements had been provided to the court.

As a consequence, the judge decided that less weight should be given to these witness statements as they "cannot be sure that the…witness statements are in their own words" and that they were required to "approach the…evidence cautiously".

This approach reflects the broader judicial trend of recent years, illustrated by the introduction of Practice Direction 57AC in the Business and Property Courts, towards requiring witness statements to be expressed in the witnesses' own words, with restrictions placed on the assistance that may be provided in their preparation

Comment

This decision gives rise to three learning points.

First, as noted, where a valid will appointing an executor exists, that executor's authority to deal with the disposal of the body derives from the will itself and not from any grant of representation. It is important to ensure that questions of will validity are considered at the outset, before any application to the court is contemplated.

Second, given that the court's clear concern in burial disputes is to ensure disposal of the body with all proper respect and decency and without unnecessary delay, this can result in the court reaching a decision which is different to any of the proposed outcomes from the different parties and any wishes expressed by the deceased. Whilst the deceased's expressed wishes remain a weighty factor, they are not determinative.  The court will consider the weight to be placed on wishes that may have been formed many years before death and in materially different circumstances.

Finally, consideration needs to be given to whether the use of AI to assist in drafting witness statements, and if AI is used, any initial drafts should be retained, so that they can be produced to evidence the true extent of the AI's involvement.  In this case there was no real suggestion, as there has been in other cases, that AI hallucinated or included facts which were not there. The decision to give the witness statements less weight on this basis therefore seems somewhat draconian, particularly given that, as noted above, the parties all acted as litigants in person. It is also difficult to see any material difference in outcome between AI assisting with drafting a witness statement and a legal representative assisting with drafting a witness statement on behalf of a client (albeit one would hope that legal representatives are less prone to possible hallucinations and similar errors).

In a previous briefing, we wrote about the amendment to Article 43 of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 – which mirrored section 53(3) of the Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 (the "Trusts Law")  – in light of the 2019 Guernsey Court of Appeal decision of Rusnano Capital AG (in liquidation) v Molard International (PTC) Limited and Pullborough International Corp ("Rusnano").^[1]

Guernsey has now almost caught up and is proposing a targeted update to its trust legislation, with an amendment to section 53(3) of its Trusts Law being one of the key proposed changes. This section is the local statutory approximation of the rule in Saunders v Vautier,^[2] an old English case that established the principle that where all persons entitled absolutely and indefeasibly to the whole of the income and capital of the trust property have been ascertained, and have full legal capacity to act in their own right, they are entitled to call for the termination of the trust and the distribution of the assets to them.

Current position under section 53

The relevant wording of section 53(3) is

"[…] where all the beneficiaries are in existence and have been ascertained, and none is a minor or a person under legal disability, they may require the trustees to terminate the trust and distribute the trust property among them."

In Rusnano, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision that a sole beneficiary can use section 53(3) of the Trusts Law to bring a trust to an end, notwithstanding there being a power to add beneficiaries.

This caused much disquiet amongst trust practitioners, as the power to add beneficiaries is sometimes a way in which trusts are used to keep the identity of the primary beneficiaries of a trust confidential. These are typically known as 'Red Cross trusts', where one beneficiary – usually a charity such as the Red Cross – will be named as the sole or default beneficiary, and the power to add beneficiaries will be exercised at a time when the primary beneficiaries (usually described in a Letter of Wishes) are due to benefit.

The Rusnano decision meant that beneficiaries of trusts whom the settlor never intended to benefit could collapse Guernsey law trusts in their favour. It is therefore unsurprising that Jersey amended Article 43 of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 to prevent the termination of a trust where there is a power to add.

The proposed amendment

It is proposed that the section 53(3) be amended so that it can only be used to terminate the trust where the class of beneficiaries is closed, which will not be possible if there is a power to add beneficiaries.

Practical implications

If implemented (and these authors cannot see why it should not be, given the positive reception the proposal has received so far), this amendment will bring the Trusts Law into line with the prevailing view in English law and other common law jurisdictions that the existence of a power to add will prevent a termination of a trust. It will also ensure that the intentions of most settlors of Red Cross trusts are protected.

In legal practice, we increasingly rely on predictions. Case outcomes, risk assessments, and AI tools shape everyday decisions.  But how reliable are they? And what risks might they introduce?

Join Professor Carissa Véliz (University of Oxford) for a discussion of what happens when those predictions are wrong, and how that affects legal judgement.

Carissa will cover:

• why more data doesn't always improve decisions.
• how predictive tools can increase risk and reinforce bias
• what this means for professional judgement, ethics and client advice

You’ll come away with a clearer view of how to use (and question) predictive tools, and how we can prepare more effectively for uncertainty.

• The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (DUAA) introduces a new statutory requirement for organisations to implement internal data protection complaints processes from 19 June 2026.  
• Individuals will be expected to raise complaints directly with organisations first, before escalating issues to the ICO.  
• Organisations must ensure complaints are handled through clear, accessible procedures, with timely acknowledgement, investigation and response. 

Setting the background  

A significant change to UK data protection law will come into force on 19 June 2026, introducing a new statutory complaints handling framework for organisations. 

The changes are introduced by the DUAA, which amends the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). As part of these reforms, organisations will be required to establish and operate an internal complaints-handling process. Individuals must use this process before escalating concerns to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). 

We previously discussed the wider implications of the DUAA and its key reforms to UK data protection law. If you would like to explore the other key changes that have been introduced, you can read our overview here.  

What is changing? 

The DUAA introduces a new section 164A into the DPA 2018, creating a statutory right for individuals to raise data protection complaints directly with organisations. 

Previously, while individuals had the right under Article 77 UK GDPR to lodge complaints with the ICO, there was no express legal requirement for organisations to maintain a dedicated internal complaints process. The new section 164A regime formalises this obligation. 

From 19 June 2026, organisations must ensure they have an appropriate complaints handling process in place. ICO guidance provides that organisations should: 

• give individuals a clear and accessible means of submitting a data protection complaint; 
• acknowledge complaints within 30 days of receipt; 
• investigate and respond to complaints “without undue delay”, keeping complainants informed throughout the process; and 
• notify complainants of the outcome without undue delay. 

The reforms also change the complaints pathway for individuals. Rather than approaching the ICO in the first instance, individuals will be expected to raise their complaint with the relevant organisation before escalating the matter to the ICO. This reflects the ICO's broader aim of encouraging complaints to be addressed and resolved directly wherever possible. 

What steps should organisations take? 

With the commencement date approaching, organisations should review their existing data protection governance arrangements to ensure they can meet the new requirements. 

In practice, this is likely to involve: 

• updating privacy notices and template responses to inform individuals of their right to make a data protection complaint, including when personal data is collected and when responding to data subject rights requests;  
• ensuring complaints are identified and acknowledged within the 30-day period, including where received electronically;  
• reviewing internal policies, procedures and staff training to ensure complaints are recognised, investigated and handled consistently; and  
• reviewing processor arrangements to ensure contracts require processors to notify and support controllers where complaints are received. 

For many organisations, these changes may involve refining existing processes rather than creating entirely new ones. Nevertheless, early preparation will be important to ensure compliance and avoid operational challenges once the new requirements take effect. 

How Mishcon de Reya can help 

If you would like advice on updating privacy notice wording or implementing compliant complaints handling procedures, do not hesitate to get in touch with our Data experts. 

He is also the Founder of Spire Ventures, his principal investment platform focused on scaling and aggregating real asset–backed operating businesses across sectors including property services, infrastructure and asset management.

With a background spanning venture capital, private equity and entrepreneurship, Faisal has built, scaled and exited businesses while investing across both high-growth technology and traditional real assets. His work sits at the intersection of AI, infrastructure and real estate, with a focus on backing category-defining companies and platforms globally.

He holds an MBA with Distinction from the University of Oxford and a degree in Business Economics and Computer Science from UCLA.

Aselle Ibraimova joins the firm’s Data team with expertise in data protection, cybersecurity and AI. She advises clients on a broad range of compliance, governance and incident response matters, and has particular experience in evolving cybersecurity regimes including NIS2 and DORA, as well as data sharing, data training issues, and complex outsourcing and technology contracts. Her clients span the media and entertainment, healthcare, technology and financial services sectors. Aselle also brings valuable in-house experience from roles at the BBC and Cerner, now Oracle Health, which gives her a strong understanding of how businesses operate and the demands placed on in-house legal teams. She joins Mishcon de Reya from Reed Smith, where she was Counsel, having previously practised at Squire Patton Boggs.

Paolo Sbuttoni is an international technology, data protection and commercial lawyer with more than 20 years’ experience. Dual-qualified in England & Wales and Hong Kong, Paolo advises on data protection and cybersecurity compliance, technology transactions (including major cloud and outsourcing projects) and AI and other evolving technologies. He brings significant cross-border experience, having spent 13 years practising in Hong Kong before returning to the UK in 2023. Paolo joins Mishcon de Reya from Foot Anstey, where he helped grow the firm’s technology and data capabilities, and previously practised at Baker McKenzie in Hong Kong, where he led the Hong Kong technology and data team.

Jeremy Hertzog, Chair of Innovation at Mishcon de Reya, commented: “Paolo and Aselle are excellent additions to our Innovation department. Their combined expertise across technology, data, cyber and AI significantly strengthens an area of strategic importance for the firm. As we continue to build our Innovation Economy offering, their experience advising clients at the cutting edge of technological change, both in the UK and internationally, will be invaluable. We are delighted to welcome them both to Mishcon de Reya.”

Aselle Ibraimova commented: “I am very pleased to be joining Mishcon de Reya’s Innovation department. The firm has an excellent reputation in data and technology, and I am excited by the opportunity to contribute further expertise in data, AI technology and cybersecurity compliance. I look forward to working with colleagues across the firm to help clients address evolving regulatory and operational challenges.”

Paolo Sbuttoni commented: “I am delighted to be joining Mishcon de Reya at a time when demand for legal advice on technology, data, AI and cybersecurity is growing so rapidly. The firm’s strength in innovation, its international outlook, and its commitment to Hong Kong and other key growth markets make it a compelling platform for my practice. I look forward to helping clients navigate complex technology and data issues across the UK and internationally.”

James Boyle, Partner and Head of the Data Group at Mishcon de Reya, added: "Paolo and Aselle joining the team represent a significant step forward for us, and underscore the remarkable growth trajectory we have been on. Their combined expertise in data protection, cybersecurity and AI brings real depth to our offering at a time when client demand in these areas has never been higher. This continued investment in top-tier talent reflects our ambition to be the go-to firm for businesses navigating the most complex data and technology challenges. I am thrilled to welcome them both to the team."

Under the proposals, applicants would be assessed according to new metrics, including their level of 'integration' and 'contribution' to British society. A key proposal is to double the standard qualifying period for settlement from five years to ten, as well as plans to remove the 10-year long residence route, and change how family members qualify.

While some people, such as high earners, could qualify for settlement faster, for many, things could become longer and even more complex.

Reading the proposals, you could easily think that qualifying for settlement is just a matter of having spent five years in the UK. This is not the case, and there are already very specific rules that you need to meet, including around the number of days you spend in the UK, your level of English language and other visa specific rules. 

The proposals have attracted a lot of attention, with over 200,000 consultation responses and a range of concerns raised, including from Labour MPs, the Law Society and a range of other stakeholders. Once of the most controversial aspects of the proposals is the potential for changes to apply retrospectively to those already in the UK, effectively changing the rules mid-way through the game for those already on their immigration journey.  Other key concerns include the impact on families, vulnerable people and what this may mean for the UK’s ability to attract international talent. 

The biggest question at present is what any change in leadership could mean for the proposals. With all eyes on the Makerfield by-election (expected on 18 June 2026), this remains a fast-moving and closely watched area.
 

Bushra Ahmed, Partner at Mishcon de Reya, has successfully acted as counsel for the winning party in a significant Court of Appeal judgment from the DIFC Courts, which clarifies the scope of enforcement powers under the new DIFC Courts Law 2025. The decision confirms that a judgment creditor enforcing a Dubai Court judgment through the DIFC Courts can require a judgment debtor to provide full information about its assets — not just those situated within the DIFC. 

What happened? 

In the case of Ostin v Oleda DIFC CA-001-2026, the Appellant obtained a judgment from the Dubai Court of First Instance for approximately AED 81.6 million arising from a construction contract dispute. Having registered and recognised that judgment in the DIFC Courts, the Appellant applied for a Part 50 examination order — a procedural tool requiring a representative of the judgment debtor to attend court and answer questions, under oath, about the debtor's assets and means of satisfying the judgment. 

The judgment debtor applied to set the order aside. The Enforcement Judge agreed to vary it, limiting the scope of any examination to assets within the DIFC only. The Appellant appealed. 

What did the Court of Appeal decide? 

The Court of Appeal, sitting before Chief Justice Wayne Martin, Justice Sir Peter Gross and Justice Robert French, allowed the appeal and restored the original order in full. 

The Court held that the DIFC Courts' enforcement jurisdiction under the 2025 Courts Law is not territorially confined to assets within the DIFC. Once a Dubai Court judgment is recognised in the DIFC Courts, the full suite of enforcement tools is available — including Part 50 examinations covering assets wherever they are held. A Part 50 order is an information-gathering mechanism, not an act of execution against a specific asset, and its availability is not conditional on first knowing where assets are located. 

Why did we say the restriction was wrong? 

The Enforcement Judge's approach created a circular problem: a judgment creditor would need to demonstrate that assets existed within the DIFC before using the very tool designed to find out whether any such assets existed. That produces a self-defeating result and one wholly at odds with the purpose of Part 50. The Court agreed and found that the restriction imposed at first instance was based on an unduly narrow reading of the 2025 Courts Law. 

Why does this matter? 

This decision has two important practical consequences for parties enforcing judgments in the UAE. 

The DIFC Courts are a genuinely effective enforcement forum, not just a recognition gateway. Businesses and their legal teams should not assume that DIFC enforcement is only useful where a debtor's assets are already known to be within the DIFC. Following this decision, the DIFC Courts can be used proactively to compel disclosure, map a debtor's full asset position, and build the evidential foundation for recovery across multiple jurisdictions. 

For creditors in construction, real estate and other sectors where large sums are in dispute and assets may be dispersed or obscured, Part 50 is now a more powerful first step. Rather than waiting to identify assets before commencing DIFC enforcement, creditors can use the examination process itself to obtain that picture under oath, and with the full authority of the Court behind it. 

This is one of the first appellate decisions interpreting the enforcement provisions of the DIFC Courts Law 2025. For companies or organisations considering enforcement action in the UAE, or that have an existing judgment they are struggling to convert into recovery, this decision may open options that were previously thought unavailable. 

Abigail is passionate about building a hospitality brand rooted in energy, kindness and excellent guest experience. Alongside leading the business, she founded Hotels with a Heart, St Giles’ charitable initiative supporting local communities, with a particular focus on underprivileged children, education and hospitality-sector wellbeing. 

With degrees in business management and international management and innovation from the University of Exeter, Abigail combines strong commercial leadership with a clear sense of purpose. Outside work, she is known for her adventurous spirit, from flying helicopters and riding motorcycles to boxing, playing guitar and spending time with her young son and dog, Elmo.

This is because the King recently proclaimed an extra bank holiday on 15 June in Scotland to recognise its men's football team's presence at the World Cup.

So why is that relevant for the rest of the UK (or, indeed, anywhere in the world where a controller is subject to the UK GDPR)? Well, Article 4A says that references in the UK GDPR to a period expressed in hours, days, weeks, months or years are to be interpreted in accordance with Article 3 of the assimilated Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No. 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits (the "Periods of Time Regulation"). Article 3 of the Periods of Time Regulation says that "where the last day of a period…is a public holiday, Sunday or Saturday, the period shall end with the expiry of the last hour of the following working day". Article 2 of the Periods of Time Regulation explains that "‘public holidays’ means a public holiday in any part of the United Kingdom" (emphasis added).

And so it is that, if a controller in England, or Wales, or Northern Ireland (or anywhere in the world, if it is subject to the extra-territorial provisions of the UK GDPR), as well as Scotland, received a DSAR on 13, 14 or 15 May this year, they will get an extra day to deal with it. Whether they support the Scotland national football team or not.

In this episode of Oxford+, host Susannah de Jager speaks with Riham Satti, co-founder and CEO of MeVitae, about her journey from studying neuroscience at Oxford to building an AI-driven platform that is transforming workforce decision-making. Riham explains how cognitive biases shape recruitment, why ten seconds of CV screening can derail a hiring process, and how organisations can use data and responsible AI to make fairer, faster, and smarter people decisions. 

With recent research showing that recruiters using biased AI tools mirror those inequitable choices up to 90% of the time, the conversation could not be more timely. Riham discusses how MeVitae combines neuroscience, anonymised recruiting, and transparent algorithms to help organisations identify hidden risks, improve candidate experience, and build genuinely inclusive workplaces. She also shares how she built the business from academic research and grant funding into an award-winning company working with major enterprise clients, offering a practical blueprint for turning scientific insight into commercial impact. 

• On 7 May 2026, the Council of the EU announced that a provisional political agreement had been reached with the European Parliament on the “AI Omnibus” (part of the EU’s Digital Omnibus simplification agenda) to streamline parts of the EU AI Act ahead of key compliance deadlines.
• The text still requires formal adoption by the Parliament and Council and publication in the Official Journal before it becomes law. This is expected before 2 August 2026.
• The agreement simplifies parts of the EU AI Act by:
  • extending key compliance deadlines for high-risk AI systems;
  • adding new prohibitions on AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery and child sexual abuse material;
  • reducing regulatory duplication for AI embedded in industrial products;
  • clarifying the supervisory role of the AI Office; and
  • introducing tailored accommodations for SMEs and small mid-cap enterprises.

Context and changes to the EU AI Act's timeline

The EU AI Act entered into force in August 2024 as the world's most comprehensive cross-sector AI legislation. Two years later, it has become a leading target of the EU's own competitiveness agenda, partly driven by sustained industry pressure. The Omnibus is the result: it is a targeted recalibration, rather than an entire change of heart, on the EU's regulatory approach to AI (which UK businesses that offer AI systems for use in the EU will still need to comply with). The risk-based framework and its core obligations remain intact, but businesses that lobbied hard for simplification now have more time to prepare, and a somewhat narrower compliance perimeter.

The provisional agreement reached between the Council and Parliament revises the key high-risk deadlines as follows:

• 2 December 2027: implementation of provisions relating to standalone high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III of the Act (for example, those used in employment, education, biometrics, critical infrastructure, and migration and border contexts).
• 2 August 2028: implementation of provisions relating to high-risk AI systems embedded in products covered by EU product-safety regimes listed in Annex I.

The extended compliance deadlines are significant. Many providers and deployers were not on course to meet the 2 August 2026 deadline, and the harmonised standards needed to support conformity assessments were not yet in place. Regulators are likely to treat the extended deadlines as an opportunity for businesses to build structured compliance programmes, rather than as permission to defer action. Meanwhile, the Commission has only recently published for consultation draft guidelines on the classification of high-risk systems under the Act.

The Act's requirements on synthetic-content marking and labelling (Article 50) have also been extended, but in a limited and targeted way. Providers of generative AI systems who placed their systems on the market before 2 August 2026 have until 2 December 2026 to comply with those watermarking obligations. Systems placed on the market on or after 2 August 2026 must still comply from that date. Other transparency obligations in Article 50 also continue to apply from 2 August 2026. Again, the guidelines relating to transparency and the Code of Practice on marking and labelling remain to be finalised.

“Nudifiers” and AI-assisted child sexual abuse material (CSAM) explicitly prohibited

The co-legislators have added a new prohibition to Article 5 of the Act targeting AI systems used to generate non-consensual sexual or intimate images of real identifiable persons (commonly referred to as "nudification" or "deepfake-nude" tools) and AI systems used to generate child sexual abuse material (CSAM). This prohibition will apply from 2 December 2026.

The prohibition operates in two ways: it applies to systems where generation of such content is the intended purpose, as well as systems where that generation is a reasonably foreseeable and reproducible outcome and the provider has not put in place reasonable and adequate technical safety measures to prevent these outputs. Deployers are prohibited from using any AI system for the purpose of generating or manipulating such material.

This is a clear enforcement signal, particularly for multimodal and image-editing tools. If your products involve image generation or content editing, assess your systems against both limbs of the prohibition and document your controls now rather than waiting for the December deadline. Violations of the Act's prohibited-practice provisions can attract fines of up to €35 million or 7% of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.

Streamlined regulation for industrial and product AI (especially machinery)

A core political contest – how the AI Act interacts with sectoral product-safety law – has landed on a pragmatic compromise.

First, AI systems in machinery will now primarily be governed by sectoral rules rather than the full AI Act high-risk regime (which will be achieved by moving the Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 from Section A to Section B of Annex I). To avoid a protection gap, the Commission must adopt delegated acts amending Annex III of the Machinery Regulation to reflect the relevant AI Act requirements, applicable by 2 August 2028. In the interim, manufacturers may rely on harmonised standards or common specifications adopted under the AI Act for a presumption of conformity.

Second, the Commission, via delegated acts (to be adopted by 2 August 2027), will be able to disapply specific AI Act requirements where EU harmonisation legislation listed in Annex I already provides an equivalent or higher level of protection for health, safety or fundamental rights, provided the overall level of protection under the AI Act is not reduced.
 

Key definitional clarifications

AI systems that solely assist users or optimise performance will not automatically trigger high-risk treatment where their failure would not create health or safety risks. If you are in manufacturing or product design, review your existing high-risk classifications against this clarification.

Although the Commission's original proposal to exempt certain lower-risk systems from having to be registered in a publicly accessible EU database under Article 49(2) of the Act was not adopted, the burden of registration information has been reduced, with points 7 and 9 of Section B of Annex VIII having been deleted.

Bias testing: using sensitive data processing

The provisional agreement extends the right to process special-category personal data for bias detection and correction to providers and deployers of all AI systems, not only high-risk ones.

The conditions are strict: processing must be strictly necessary and cannot be achieved by other means including synthetic or anonymised data; the data must not be transmitted, transferred or otherwise accessed by third parties; appropriate technical security and access controls must be in place; and records must document why processing was strictly necessary and why the objective could not be achieved otherwise. Legal, data protection, and technical teams will need to work together to make practical use of this.

Governance and sandboxes

The agreement gives the AI Office a significantly expanded enforcement toolkit. Originally, the AI Office had a general ability to request information, conduct evaluations, and request measures. The new provisions add: on-site and remote inspection powers; the power to launch formal investigations; the ability to accept binding commitments; authority to issue non-compliance decisions; and the power to impose fines and periodic penalties, with standard procedural safeguards for those subject to investigation.

The AI Office will also now have exclusive competence over AI systems where the same provider, or providers forming part of the same undertaking, develops both a general-purpose AI model and a downstream system built on it. The "same undertaking" limb is new and commercially significant: within corporate groups where model development and system deployment sit in different subsidiaries, the AI Office holds exclusive supervisory competence. National competent authorities retain oversight in specific regulated sectors, including law enforcement, financial services, and border management.

The deadline for Member States to establish national AI regulatory sandboxes is pushed back to 2 August 2027. An EU-level sandbox is also being created, with priority access for SMEs (including start-ups) and small mid-cap enterprises (SMCs).

New definitions of SMEs and SMCs

The agreement introduces formal definitions for SMEs and SMCs into the AI Act and extends a range of accommodations to both categories, including simplified technical documentation, proportionate quality-management-system requirements, reduced fine caps, and priority access to AI regulatory sandboxes.

AI literacy obligation softened

The Omnibus text rewrites Article 4, replacing an outcome-based duty to "ensure a sufficient level" of AI literacy with a softer obligation to "take measures to support the development of" literacy, without mandating any specific level of competence. The change reflects sustained pressure from smaller businesses, which argued that a uniform, enforceable literacy standard was disproportionately burdensome given the wide variation in how different organisations use AI. Recital 5 of the agreed text acknowledges that a one-size-fits-all approach was "not suitable for all types of providers and deployers" and that imposing it risked creating compliance costs without meaningfully advancing the underlying goal.

Interestingly, the official press release does not mention this change at all. Yet Recital 5 of the agreed text states that "AI literacy should be a strategic priority, regardless of regulatory obligations and potential sanctions". In other words, while the legal standard may have been lowered, the regulatory expectation has not. Providers and deployers that treat the revised wording as permission to do nothing will be exposed: where an AI system causes harm and an investigation reveals that staff lacked the basic understanding to operate it safely, the absence of any structured literacy programme will be difficult to defend.

Businesses should therefore document the measures they have taken, tie literacy initiatives to the specific AI systems their staff actually use, and ensure that training records are maintained.   The Commission and Member States are required to support these efforts, including by publishing practical examples on the AI Act's single information platform.

Key next steps

• Use the extra time for 'high-risk' compliance wisely. Although the Omnibus delays the high-risk obligations, it does not remove the need to build system inventories, risk-classification logic, supplier due diligence, and evidence packs. The additional time will likely raise the bar for what regulators consider reasonable preparedness.
• Prioritise transparency now. Many organisations are already in scope for Article 50 because they run chatbots, generate content at scale, or publish AI-assisted materials, well before the high-risk rules apply. Providers of systems on the market before 2 August 2026 have until 2 December 2026 to comply with rules around marking and labelling of artificially generated or manipulated content (but all other transparency rules apply from 2 August).
• Reassess content-safety controls and map product AI overlaps. The new prohibited-practice provisions on non-consensual intimate imagery and CSAM carry some of the highest penalty exposure in the Act and should prompt an immediate review of safeguards across image-generation and content-editing pipelines. Separately, if you are in product AI, start mapping overlaps with the machinery and sectoral regimes now rather than waiting for delegated acts to materialise.

Note that, until the agreement is formally adopted and published in the Official Journal (intended to happen before 2 August 2026), the original implementation date of 2 August 2026 remains in place, rather than any of the proposed extended deadlines.

For further insights and practical guidance on all things AI (including governance and compliance frameworks), visit our AI resource centre.

• Following a consultation in 2021 and recommendations made by an independent panel in 2024, the Government has decided to proceed with implementing a UK re-domiciliation regime.
• Re-domiciliation enables a company incorporated in another jurisdiction to change its place of incorporation – in this case to the UK – while maintaining its legal identity as a corporate body.
• Highlighting UK growth as a key mission, the Government has confirmed the regime will be inward only.

What is redomiciliation and why might a company re-domicile?

Re-domiciliation enables a company incorporated in another jurisdiction to change its place of incorporation while maintaining its legal identity as a corporate body. Re-domiciliation gives companies maximum continuity over their business operations, because the business continues in its existing form in the existing body corporate. The body corporate just changes its place of incorporation. Where re-domiciliation is not possible, as is currently the case in the UK, a business would need to incorporate a new company in the UK and then transfer its business and operations to that new entity. This breaks continuity and significantly increases administrative burden.

A company might choose to re-domicile for a variety of reasons. Among the examples given in the consultation paper are to gain better access to capital, simplify group structures, access less burdensome tax regimes and for other commercial, economic or political reasons.

Why is the Government consulting on implementation of a re-domiciliation framework?

In 2021, a consultation sought views on whether to establish a UK corporate re-domiciliation regime to make it easier for foreign companies to move to the UK. Following positive stakeholder views, an Independent Expert Panel (the Panel) was established, which published a Report in October 2024. The Government is now responding to the Panel's recommendations and setting out its detailed proposals for its proposed framework.

The Government believes that the UK is well-placed in attracting companies wishing to re-locate due to its business-friendly environment, competitive tax regime, world-leading company law framework, dynamic capital markets and large skilled workforce.

Research has found that a significant proportion of demand for a re-domiciliation regime is likely to come from multinationals restructuring their group, predominantly moving blocks of intermediate holding companies to the UK. The research also indicated it may be particularly attractive to companies within the financial services sector, for example, those wishing to take advantage of the UK’s highly competitive tax regimes for asset holding companies and captive insurance companies.

Having considered the potential merits of an outward facing regime, the Government has concluded that the potential drawbacks outweigh the benefits and will focus instead on an inward regime addressing demand for companies wishing to move to the UK.

The proposed framework

The Government agrees with the Panel’s general approach for a UK regime. The key features of the proposed framework are:

• Re-domiciliation to the UK should be available to a body corporate which is solvent and intends to carry on business following its re-domiciliation.
• The protection of the members, creditors and others in its existing jurisdiction will be a matter for the law of that jurisdiction.
• Applicants for re-domiciliation will have the flexibility as to whether to become a private or public UK company upon re-domiciliation.
• Once a body corporate has re-domiciled to the UK, it should be treated broadly in the same way as a company originally incorporated in the UK.

Information that will be required from a body corporate re-domiciling

The proposal is that a body corporate re-domiciling to the UK will become subject to UK company law and therefore any such body corporate will need to provide the same information as someone applying to form a company in the UK. As the foreign body corporate already exists as a legal entity, it will also be required to provide additional information in respect of any existing obligations and assets.

Among the information to be provided will be the applicant's current form, jurisdiction in which it is registered, registered number (if applicable) and registered office address.

In line with the Panel's recommendations, it is proposed that persons who will be directors when the applicant becomes a UK company should be required to make a solvency statement based on the requirements for a reduction of capital (as set out in section 643 of the Companies Act 2006).  

Administering the regime – the role of Companies House

The Government intends that Companies House will administer the regime and determine applications for re-domiciliation to the UK, and it is likely that Companies House would issue non-statutory guidance, which could cover expected timeframes for example.

The 2021 consultation proposed that the eligibility criteria for applications to re-domicile should include a requirement that the application poses no threats or risks to national security, with discretion for UK authorities to assess potential risks. Since then, however, the role of Companies House has evolved – it has new powers to require, remove and share information and new measures have recently  been introduced requiring directors and PSCs to verify their identities (see our recap here).

On incorporation of a new company a statement is now required that the company will be formed for a lawful purpose. Companies House has a new power to strike a company from the register where information in the registration application is false or misleading. The Panel recommended in its Report that applicants for re-domiciliation should be subject to an equivalent requirement to new incorporations when making their application to confirm that future activities will be lawful. The Government agrees that this, combined with Companies House's new role and powers, would present adequate protection in addition to existing laws relating to national security which would apply on an ongoing basis.

Other issues to consider

Assuming that the regime is implemented, the list of issues for a body corporate considering re-domiciling to consider will depend on its circumstances. For example:

• If the company has issued bearer shares (which no longer exist as a concept in UK company law), it will need to consider how to deal with these, likely having either to cancel them or convert them to registered form.
• If the company has shares that are subject to existing security interests, these will need to be carefully reviewed before an application is made: the validity and priority of charges created before re-domiciliation is likely to involve a determination under the law applicable before re-domiciliation along with, to the extent applicable, UK conflict of law rules.
• If the company is already registered on the UK's Register of Overseas Entities (which records the beneficial owners of foreign entities that hold UK land), it is proposed that the corporate body will be under a duty to de-register from the ROE within a specified period.

Next steps

Implementation of a UK corporate re-domiciliation regime will require primary legislation to make the required changes to company and tax legislation. The Government plans to introduce legislation as soon as possible “when parliamentary time allows.” Operational implementation will also be required, and this will be led by Companies House. The consultation closes on 19 June 2026.

You can read the full article on the EGR website.

Ed’s main point is that investors will need to show they are genuinely improving housing supply, quality and affordability if they want to retain public and political support.

You can read the full article here (subscription required).

The portfolio includes five large distribution centres in Coventry, Reading, Burgess Hill, Barnsley and Wakefield, covering nearly 1 million sq ft in total. The buildings are let to well-known occupiers, including DHL, GXO, Puma and Evri.

The sale is an important step for Equites, helping it realise value from its UK assets and recycle capital into its South African development pipeline. It also highlights continued demand for high-quality logistics space in strong locations across the UK.

Mishcon de Reya advised Equites on all aspects of the transaction, with teams from Real Estate, Corporate, Tax, Banking, Construction and Planning working together to support the deal.

Riaan Gous, Chief Operating Officer at Equites Property Fund, commented: "We are pleased to have completed the sale of the Springbox portfolio to ICG Real Estate. This transaction is an important milestone for Equites, allowing us to realise value from a mature UK portfolio, support balance sheet flexibility and recycle capital into higher-yielding development opportunities in South Africa. The Mishcon de Reya team, led by Anju Suneja, provided excellent support throughout this process with their ability to bring together expertise across multiple disciplines proving invaluable in delivering the transaction for us."

Anju Suneja commented: "Having advised Equites since their entry to the UK market, it has been a privilege to support them on this landmark transaction. It shows the continued appeal of well-let logistics assets to investors, and the value of a collaborative approach across different legal disciplines on complex deals."

With over 140 fee earners, including 46 partners, Mishcon de Reya's Real Estate department is one of London's largest and most diverse property teams. Our Real Estate department includes well-regarded specialist practice areas and provides a one-stop shop for all of our clients' property requirements, delivering a seamless service from investment, structuring, funding, acquisition and planning, through to construction, development, tax and litigation advice. Real Estate is one of the three key strategic sectors outlined in the firm's Vision 2030 strategy.

• The Court of Appeal has unanimously overturned the CAT's finding that HOKA manufacturer, Deckers, infringed competition law when it refused to allow one of its retailers, Up & Running, from selling its shoes on a discount website.
• In doing so, the court has clarified when controls in a selective distribution system amount to a "by object" restriction under the Competition Act 1998, confirming that such a finding requires assessment not just of the arrangement's objective or purpose, but also its content and scope, legal context, and economic context (including market structure and market shares).
• Applying this framework, the court found that there was no basis upon which the CAT could have reached the conclusion that the arrangement had the object of restricting competition,  placing significant weight on the narrow scope of the restriction, the strength of inter-brand competition, and the parties' relatively small market shares in the market.
• The court further found the conduct would have been block-exempt in any event, as the relevant hardcore restrictions were not made out on the facts and each party's market share was well below the 30% threshold.
• This judgment will be good news for businesses operating selective distribution systems as it sets the record straight on the importance of the economic reality to any "by object" analysis and confirms that "hardcore" pricing restrictions are not automatically restrictive by object. The scope and objective of restrictions on distributors remain important and in-house legal teams should ensure their arrangements are carefully designed and criteria are applied consistently and objectively.

On 8 May 2026, the Court of Appeal handed down its highly anticipated judgment in Deckers UK Limited v Up & Running (UK) Limited, overturning the earlier judgment by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). At the heart of the appeal was a fundamental competition law question: when do controls imposed by a supplier within a selective distribution system on the outlets through which goods are sold and which impact price competition, amount to a restriction of competition “by object” under section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 (CA98)? Otherwise known as the "Chapter I Prohibition", this provision prohibits agreements that may affect trade within the UK and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK.

Selective distribution systems are a widespread and generally lawful distribution model used by brands across premium retail, sports goods, fashion, and specialist consumer goods sectors, under which a supplier limits resale of its products to retailers that meet defined qualitative or quantitative criteria.

The Court of Appeal's finding is of real practical importance to businesses operating selective distribution systems, particularly in retail settings, where the desire to have control over online sales, pricing and brand presentation often sit in uneasy tension with competition law.

Background

The appellant, Deckers, supplied its HOKA-branded running shoes to Up & Running (U&R) on a wholesale basis via its selective distribution system from 2016 to 2021. U&R, founded in 1992, is a UK specialist running retailer selling shoes, including HOKA shoes, and accessories through both physical stores and its website, upandrunning.co.uk.

Deckers structured its distribution around two distinct channels: a "Main Retail Channel" for seasonal stock, supplied to an authorised network of retailers who were expected to align with HOKA's positioning as a prestige product; and a "Clearance Channel" for a group of specifically appointed online retailers to sell residual, out of season HOKA stock. Notably, Deckers also sold HOKA products directly to consumers (both online and through its own bricks-and-mortar stores)  in both the Main Retail Channel and the Clearance Channel, placing it in direct competition with its authorised distributors, such as U&R.

The key controls imposed by Deckers can be found in Clause 15 of the terms and conditions imposed upon Deckers' distributors, and an email Deckers sent to its retailers in July 2019. Clause 15 required distributors to obtain Deckers' permission before they could sell HOKA shoes online. By email dated 10 July 2019, Deckers further said that retailers' websites should have a domain name that is "identical or similar" to the name of the retailers' physical store, otherwise they must notify Deckers.

In July 2020, U&R proposed the launch of a new, anonymised, unbranded clearance website: "runningshoes.co.uk". The idea was prompted by the need to clear excess stock built up over the COVID-19 period, but the site would be retained as a permanent clearance channel. Deckers refused permission, saying that the proposal cut across the “fundamental principles of its brand strategy”. Nevertheless, U&R went ahead with the launch, and, in response, Deckers terminated supply to U&R on grounds of breach of contract.

U&R brought proceedings against Deckers in the CAT, alleging that Deckers’ terms and conditions amounted to a restriction of competition by object in breach of section 2 of the CA98, in two closely related ways:

1. First, they restricted U&R’s ability to market and sell HOKA products online, and more generally to make effective use of the internet as a sales channel (the Online Sales Restriction); and/or
2. Secondly, Deckers’ attempt to prevent U&R from selling HOKA-branded shoes through its website was attempted retail price maintenance (RPM), and the decision to rely on Clause 15 to terminate supply was motivated by a desire to shut down the website in order to maintain higher prices for HOKA products (the RPM Restriction).

Deckers denied that there was a breach of the Chapter I Prohibition and argued that its selective distribution system was exempt from the prohibition by virtue of the Metro "safe harbour" criteria (Case C-26/76 Metro v Commission) and the Vertical Block Exemption (Commission Regulation (EU) 330/2010) (VBE).

The CAT's findings

The CAT found in favour of U&R on liability, holding that Deckers' selective distribution system failed the Metro criteria and infringed the Chapter I Prohibition "by object" by reason of the Online Sales Restriction and the RPM Restriction.  Fundamentally, the CAT found there was no "legitimate aim" or "plausible explanation" for the Clause 15 and its application, other than to restrict intra-brand competition (that is, U&R's freedom to make passive sales via the internet) and to prevent discounting by retailers on clearance websites. On the CAT's reading of case law such as Super Bock, if the only plausible explanation for conduct is the restriction of competition, it necessarily falls within the scope of a "by object" infringement: there was no need for any wider economic assessment.

Having concluded that Deckers had committed two separate infringements of the Chapter I Prohibition which the CAT found to be "hardcore restrictions" in terms of the VBE, the CAT found that the VBE did not apply to relieve Deckers of liability.

The CAT observed that the facts of the case were unusual – including because it found that Deckers’ selective distribution system was "incomplete and flawed in its design and operation" and Deckers could not evidence its position. The CAT was therefore careful to emphasise that its decision should not be taken to mean that selective distribution arrangements falling outside the Metro "safe harbour" will generally amount to restrictions by object or hardcore restrictions. Acknowledging that the limitation of price competition is inherent in selective distribution systems, the CAT said compliance is about ensuring there is a legitimate aim and a clear link between that aim and a well-designed set of vertical restraints.

Deckers appealed the CAT's decision on the grounds that the CAT:

• mischaracterised Deckers' conduct as involving hardcore RPM;
• failed to apply the correct test in law for establishing a "by object" infringement;
• failed to properly apply the correct law to the facts of the case (and if it had, the CAT would have had to conclude that Deckers' conduct was not capable of sufficiently harming competition); and
• failed to properly apply the VBE.

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) intervened in the appeal, noting that it too considered the CAT’s judgment to contain a material error of law. The appeal was heard in February 2026, with judgment handed down on 8 May 2026.

The Court of Appeal's judgment: clarifying the legal test

The Court of Appeal allowed Deckers' appeal in its entirety, agreeing that the CAT had indeed erred in law. Critical to the Court of Appeal's judgment was its rejection of the CAT's interpretation of case law including Cartes Bancaires,¹ Ping,² Generics³ and Super Bock⁴ regarding the approach to assessing "by object" restrictions. Where the CAT saw objective or purpose as dispositive of the question of infringement, the Court of Appeal confirmed that such a finding requires a sufficient degree of harm to competition, assessed not only by reference to objective or purpose, but also:

1. the content of the agreement or its scope;
2. its legal context; and
3. its economic context, including market structure, inter-brand competition, and market shares.

With reference to this framework, the Court identified five specific errors in the CAT's conclusions:

1. That the test for assessing a "by object" infringement depends on the objective or purpose of the restriction and that, absent a plausible explanation, a clause with a restrictive purpose is a restriction by object.
2. That other factors were treated as irrelevant to this analysis.
3. That a selective distribution agreement falling outside the Metro "safe harbour" was, or was very likely to be, a restriction by object.
4. That classification as a "hardcore" restriction under the VBE was equivalent to a restriction by object under the Chapter I Prohibition (which it is not).
5. That unfettered discretion in contractual terms was inherently an object restriction because it could be used for an anti-competitive purpose.

Applying the test to the facts

Applying the test to the CAT's own factual findings, the court ultimately tested whether Deckers' termination of supply to U&R could ever have sufficiently impacted competition. Its conclusion was clear: it could not.

Working through each element in turn:

1. On content, the court emphasised that the narrower the restriction, the more limited its ability to exert harm. In this case, a number of factors combined to underscore the restriction's limited scope including, for example, that it concerned a tranche of clearance stock, that it was targeted at a single retailer and a single anonymised website only, and that the number of pairs of shoes affected represented only a tiny subset of the relevant product market.
2. On objective, the court accepted that Deckers' conduct was linked to concern about the level of price discount that U&R intended but emphasised that objective was one factor, not the whole test. Because the CAT identified a pricing-related objective, it failed to consider and give appropriate weight to the fact that Clause 15 and the July email were also legitimately designed to protect the integrity of Deckers' distribution system.
3. On legal context, the court canvassed relevant case law and noted that restrictions inherent in selective distribution systems which mute price competition or those which prohibit particular types of internet sales are not, without more, a restriction of competition by object - and the classification of a restriction as "hardcore" under the VBE did not, of itself, alter that analysis.
4. On economic context, which proved crucial to the outcome, the court referred to the economic evidence that Deckers was the sixth largest supplier in a market where approximately 10 suppliers shared 70% of the market, and there were no material barriers to entry. Taken together with the limited scope of the restriction, the share of the market that would be affected by the restriction was therefore very small. Further, the classification of the agreement as vertical rather than horizontal gave the court comfort that it presented "systemically lower risk to competition", especially given the evidence of strong inter-brand competition.

On the VBE question, the court found that the relevant "hardcore" restrictions (RPM and passive sales) as that term is used in the VBE were only triggered if they restricted pricing freedom or customer access to goods (respectively) in a "real and practical sense". This was not made out on the facts, particularly because of the narrow scope of the restriction in this case. In addition, each party's market share was well below the 30% threshold. Accordingly, the court was satisfied that the challenged conduct would have been block-exempt.

The court declined to remit the case to the CAT, finding that the CAT had all the relevant findings before it but simply failed to draw the inevitable conclusion. On those facts, Deckers' conduct did not amount to a restriction by object under the Chapter I Prohibition – and in any event, it would have been exempt under VBE.

Key takeaways

Although the Court of Appeal's judgment is grounded heavily in the specific facts of this case, three useful points emerge, particularly for suppliers operating selective distribution systems.

1. "Hardcore" pricing restrictions are not automatically restrictive by object
   
   Even conduct that is classified as "hardcore" RPM cannot be automatically treated as a restriction "by object": these two concepts are not co-extensive. There must still be an assessment of whether the restriction reveals a sufficient degree of harm in its full legal and economic context bearing in mind the restriction's scope/content, objectives, and legal and economic context. 
    

2. The scope and content of any restriction matters – and context can be decisive
   
   Where the CAT appeared to focus almost exclusively on the purpose of the restriction, the Court of Appeal clarified this is only one of the factors to be considered. The Court of Appeal placed significant weight on the genuinely narrow scope of the restriction in this case as well as the competitive market dynamics (including the strength of inter-brand competition and market shares).

3. Draft controls carefully and apply them consistently
   
   Whilst the Court of Appeal rejected the idea that a broad, unfettered discretion is inherently unlawful "by object" merely because it could be abused, wide discretion still significantly increases risk. Businesses should ensure their online channel controls have clearly articulated, objective, non-price rationales (such as brand presentation, consumer experience standards, and anti-free-riding protection) and apply those criteria consistently across the network, building procedural safeguards into refusal and termination decisions.

This judgment helpfully clarifies the approach to assessing selective distribution restrictions beyond the Metro "safe harbour" and confirms that even when a restriction is partly motivated by curbing price competition, it will not automatically infringe competition law. This should give greater confidence to suppliers operating well-structured selective distribution systems pursuing legitimate commercial aims. However, the emphasis is on the context: suppliers with significant market positions or those seeking to enforce broader restrictions than seen in Deckers can expect much greater scrutiny. And as always with selective distribution, the quality of design, documentation, and consistent application remains critical.

Mishcon de Reya's Competition team advises businesses across a broad range of sectors on the design, review, and compliance assessment of selective distribution systems under UK competition law, including in relation to the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order and the Chapter I Prohibition.

If you would like to discuss what this judgment means for your distribution arrangements, please contact Chanelle Cattin or Victoria Hirst of our Competition team.

• From 1 January 2027, employees gain unfair dismissal rights after six months' service, not two years.
• Anyone continuously employed on or before 1 July 2026 gets unfair dismissal protection from 1 January 2027.
• Six-month probationary periods no longer leave a safe dismissal window, as statutory minimum notice protection can push a decision made shortly before the six-month point into unfair dismissal territory.
• Employers therefore need to make decisions far sooner about whether an employee should be kept on past their probationary period, if they wish to avoid the risk of an unfair dismissal claim.
• Employers should tighten their probationary processes to ensure they actively review the new joiner's progress during probation and make a decision whether to keep or terminate them before they acquire unfair dismissal rights.

Background

Unfair dismissal is a statutory right that protects employees from being dismissed without a fair reason and a fair process, but an employee must first complete a minimum qualifying period of continuous service before they qualify for the right (unless they are dismissed for an 'automatically unfair' reason such as whistleblowing or maternity leave, in which case they are protected from 'day one'). At present, the qualifying period is two years.

The length of the qualifying period has ranged between six months and two years over the past half century, with Conservative Governments consistently favouring a longer period and Labour Governments a shorter one. The current Labour Government had originally intended to make unfair dismissal a 'day one' right, but following a "series of constructive conversations" between trade unions and business representatives, the Government eventually compromised on a six-month qualifying period. This change, which still marks a substantial reduction from the current two year threshold, is just one of the major changes introduced by the Employment Rights Act 2025 (ERA 2025) which we cover in our Employment Rights Act Hub.

Changes to the qualifying period have typically been made by secondary legislation (statutory instruments) rather than primary legislation. The ERA 2025 goes a step further: it removes the power to vary the qualifying period by secondary legislation altogether, meaning any future Government wishing to lengthen the period will need to pass primary legislation to do so - a significantly higher bar.

What is changing and when?

The new six-month qualifying period comes into force on 1 January 2027. Any employee who has been continuously employed for at least six months at the date of their dismissal will be entitled to protection from unfair dismissal. In practice, this means that any employee employed on or before 1 July 2026 will already have accrued the requisite six months' service by the time the change takes effect. For example, an employee hired on 1 May 2026 will have eight months' service by 1 January 2027 and will be able to claim unfair dismissal from that date.

Increase in tribunal claims

In its ERA 2025 Economic Analysis, dated January 2026, the Government estimates that around 6.3 million employees (approximately 22% of those aged 16 and over) have between six months' and two years' service with their current employer, and will benefit from the increased job security the change brings.

Together with the additional ERA 2025 unfair dismissal reform to remove the compensation cap on unfair dismissal claims (as we discuss in a forthcoming article in this series), the Government expects the reduction in the qualifying period to generate around 9,000 additional Acas early conciliation cases and approximately 3,000 additional Employment Tribunal claims per year, making these reforms the largest expected driver of increased caseload across all the Employment Rights Act 2025 reforms.

This will clearly have a financial impact on businesses; arising not only from the cost of settlements and the legal costs of handling Acas and Employment Tribunal claims, but also from more resource-intensive dismissal processes. In its Economic Analysis, the Government has acknowledged this and highlighted that small and micro businesses are likely to be disproportionately affected because they are more likely to employ staff with six months to two years' service, are less likely to have formal contractual probationary processes in place, and have more limited HR and legal resources to draw on.

Practical implications for employers

There are a number of practical implications of the reduced qualifying period.

The most immediate impact is on probationary periods. Many employers currently operate six-month probationary periods for new staff, relying on the two-year qualifying period as a buffer that allows them to part ways with a new employee whose performance or conduct has not met expectations, without the risk of an unfair dismissal claim. Under the new regime, that buffer will be significantly reduced, because by six-months, the unfair dismissal right will already be engaged.

Employers would therefore be wise to shorten probationary periods to either no more than five months without any extension, or to four months, with the option of a one-month extension if needed, so that the total does not exceed five months. This preserves a window in which a managed exit remains lower risk, whilst still giving some time to properly assess a new hire. An initial four-month period also provides essential headroom once the statutory minimum notice addition is taken into account (see below).

Probationary periods should also include structured, regular review points. Concerns, training needs and performance issues should be well-documented throughout, so that any decision to dismiss does not come as a surprise to the employee.

An important and frequently misunderstood point concerns the interaction between the qualifying period and statutory minimum notice. Once an employee has completed one month's service, they are entitled to a minimum of one week's statutory minimum notice. Where an employer dismisses without giving that statutory minimum notice, the date used to calculate unfair dismissal qualifying service is deemed to be the date on which the statutory minimum notice would have expired. This applies whether or not the employment contract contains a payment in lieu of notice (PILON) clause and regardless of whether payment in lieu is made. The only exception here is where the employer dismisses because the employee has committed gross misconduct, in which case no statutory minimum notice is added. In practice, this means that an employer who dismisses (or pays in lieu) at five months and three weeks will find that the deemed date of termination for calculating unfair dismissal qualifying service falls one week later. This takes qualifying service past the six-month threshold and the employee will acquire unfair dismissal protection. The safe course for employers is therefore to make the dismissal decision early enough that the six-month qualifying period isn't reached, even after taking into account an extra one week's statutory minimum notice. With a four-month probationary period and a one-month extension, a decision made at or before five months leaves sufficient headroom.

More broadly, employers should review and tighten disciplinary, grievance and performance management processes now, ahead of 1 January 2027. Good processes are the primary defence against an unfair dismissal claim succeeding. Even where an employee has not yet accrued six months' service, it is good practice to follow a minimum process and give a reason for dismissal. An aggrieved employee may still bring claims (for example, discrimination or whistleblowing) that carry no qualifying period, and a poorly handled dismissal increases litigation risk.

Finally, there is a concern that the reduced qualifying period may lead some employers to become more risk-averse in their hiring decisions, potentially to the detriment of candidates who are perceived as less certain to succeed. This carries genuine risks of unconscious (or even conscious) bias in recruitment, which can give rise to discrimination risks. Employers should be alert to this.

Employer action points

• Invest in thorough recruitment processes, including structured interviews, proper reference-checking and robust onboarding programmes. The shorter qualifying period means there is less room to correct a poor hiring decision once an employee is in post.
• Review probationary procedures and update HR policies to reflect the new six-month qualifying period with effect from 1 January 2027.
• Train managers on effective performance and disciplinary management and how to use probationary periods properly. The Acas Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures sets out the baseline that Employment Tribunals expect employers to have followed. Managers should be familiar with it and understand how to apply it in practice. Equally important is ensuring that training is actually implemented - training that is delivered but not applied is of limited value when a claim is brought.
• Set expectations with a new joiner for performance and conduct clearly and in writing from the start of employment, and follow up promptly when those expectations are not met. Early intervention is key: issues that are left to drift become harder to address fairly and harder to rely on as grounds for dismissal.
• Do not avoid difficult conversations. Concerns that are not clearly communicated cannot be properly understood or acted upon by the employee. An employee who is dismissed without having received clear prior warnings is far more likely to perceive the process as unfair, and far more likely to bring a claim as a result.
• Apply robust employment processes. Ultimately, robust processes, consistent management and fair treatment remain the most effective tools for minimising both the risk of a successful unfair dismissal claim and the wider reputational and operational costs of a contested dismissal. Employers who invest in getting this right now will be well placed when the new regime takes effect in January 2027.

How Mishcon de Reya can help

Our Employment team regularly advises employers on all aspects of the employment lifecycle, from recruitment and onboarding through to performance management, disciplinary processes and dismissals. We can help you review and update your probationary procedures, employment contracts and HR policies ahead of the January 2027 changes, and provide tailored training for managers on how to handle these issues in practice. If you would like to discuss how the reduced qualifying period may affect your business, please get in touch with your usual contact or a member of the Employment team.

In her contribution, Jennifer highlights that while there may be a case for targeted reform, there is little appetite among professionals for sweeping legislative change. She notes that “neither employment lawyers nor their clients… are calling for a ban on non-competes,” cautioning that comparisons with jurisdictions such as California can be misleading given the distinctive legal and commercial ecosystem there.

Jennifer also emphasises the importance of the current common law framework, which she describes as striking a “careful and workable balance” between protecting employers’ legitimate business interests and preserving employee mobility.

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Before founding ivee, Amelia built her career in Foreign Exchange Sales & Trading at Goldman Sachs. She is also a published fellow at Cambridge University, specialising in skills prediction and analysis, and is a current member of the Women in Tech UK Government Taskforce. Outside work, Amelia is an ex-international athlete, having represented England in both lacrosse and rugby. 

Lydia brings a strong background in technology, operations and investment. She is recognised as one of the Top 50 Women in Tech in the UK, and previously worked in Venture Capital at Deloitte Ventures, focusing on the future of work, as well as in management consulting at Deloitte and as an analyst at Macquarie Investment Bank. 

Founded by the sisters, ivee helps individuals and businesses build and measure AI capability in a practical way. Users improve their skills through accessible, task-based learning, while companies can upskill teams, drive AI adoption and hire from a network of AI-fluent talent. Each user builds a dynamic AI Skills Profile that updates as they learn, giving employers clear visibility of capability across their organisation. 

The conference reflected the breadth and depth of the firm’s disputes practice, with litigators and arbitration specialists from across the business sharing perspectives on the changing disputes market, client expectations, innovation in delivery, and the increasingly international nature of disputes work. 

Sessions throughout the day highlighted the scale of Mishcon’s disputes offering across a wide range of court systems, tribunals and arbitral seats worldwide, and showcased the strength of the firm’s cross-practice and cross-border collaboration. 

The conference also explored the strategic priorities shaping the future of the practice, including talent acquisition and retention, international growth, and the use of technology and AI in disputes. 

A strategy session led by Daniel Naftalin, Managing Partner Elect, and Hugo Plowman, Chair of the Dispute Resolution Department, placed disputes at the centre of Vision 2030 and reflected on the role that landmark litigation has played in shaping the firm’s identity - from its earliest disputes heritage through to more recent significant matters including the Gina Miller constitutional cases, the Hiscox COVID litigation, the case for the Federal Republic of Nigeria against P&ID and the work that the firm has done advising the liquidators on the collapse of China Evergrande.

A separate session led by Nick West, Chief Strategy Officer, focused on the role of technology in disputes, including the way AI and structured workflows are beginning to reshape how complex matters are delivered.

The conference concluded with a discussion on the future growth of the practice and the importance of deeper collaboration across teams and jurisdictions. 

Hugo Plowman said: “We’re a disputes powerhouse, but our ambition is to make Mishcon an internationally recognised leading disputes firm. To do this, we need to present our collective strength to the outside world and continue to drive value for our clients across teams, disciplines and offices. This event was an important step in revitalising our shared identity as a firmwide disputes team and in developing a common understanding of the strategic direction of this important part of our business.”

Lauren said that although executors can begin sorting possessions before probate is granted, they should avoid giving away or selling items of value at this stage. Some institutions may still need to see the grant of probate before releasing or selling items.

She added: “Where there’s no will, personal representatives must wait until letters of administration are issued, which can delay the process. The personal representatives must also ensure appropriate contents insurance is in place while the possessions remain within their control.”

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Amanda Gray comments on these generational and cultural shifts, explaining that younger generations are redefining car collecting by prioritising sustainability, innovation, and personal values. She notes: “No longer are collectors solely driven by just acquisition, but different forms of value assessment come into play, such as clean energy, sustainability and efficiency… What we drive and what we collect are projections, emblematic of personal values and identity.”

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 Lydia commented: “They’re generally distinguished from prior generations by a longer-term approach to investments, a greater tolerance for complexity, and an increasingly sophisticated, values-driven approach to how and where they commit capital”, and expects to see more HNW Millennials diversify their portfolio beyond public equities and bonds and into alternative asset classes.  

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Coinciding with Mental Health Awareness Week, Matt joined us to discuss his new novel, The Midnight Train, a moving exploration of love, regret and the choices that define us. He reflected on how we make sense of the past, what we might do differently if given another chance, and how identity and self-compassion influence us.

The session gave us the chance to hear from one of today’s most thoughtful and relatable voices, while exploring the themes at the heart of his new book.

Infrawatch is building what it describes as the Internet Infrastructure Intelligence Layer, a cybersecurity platform designed to help organisations identify, track and disrupt the infrastructure behind cyberattacks, fraud, scams, phishing and online abuse. Founded by Lloyd Davies, the company enables security, fraud and investigations teams to classify malicious infrastructure in real time. 

The platform processes tens of billions of events each day, transforming internet-scale visibility into clear, actionable intelligence. By helping organisations understand how infrastructure behaves, who may be operating it and whether it should be trusted, Infrawatch aims to help teams move from reactive monitoring to a more pre-emptive defence posture. The new funding will support the company’s next stage of growth, including further engineering and research hires, accelerated product development, early enterprise deployments and expansion into the United States. 

Lloyd Davies of Infrawatch commented: "I would like to thank the Mishcon team for helping navigate Infrawatch through the investment process and ensuring the deal got over the line in a timely and focused manner. I look forward to continuing our great work with Attilio, John and the wider Mishcon team as we focus on building the platform and growing the business." 

Attilio Leccisotti, Partner at Mishcon de Reya, commented: “Infrawatch is addressing a fast-evolving and increasingly important area of cybersecurity. Its approach to infrastructure intelligence has the potential to give organisations a clearer and earlier view of cyber threats, fraud and online abuse. We are pleased to have supported Lloyd and the team on this important milestone.”